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Abstract
This thesis is made of five different chapters. Herewith is given the abstract for each 
of the chapters.
Chp 1 : OPTIMAL FISCAL AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE POLICY IN A 
TWO CLASS ECONOMY
This paper deals with optimal taxation and provision of public goods in a two-class 
economy with non linear income and linear commodity taxes. As far as optimal 
taxation is concerned, we first show that with two private goods the good 
complementary with leisure should be taxed more heavily. Second the standard 
income tax rules are shown to be augmented by considerations for offsetting the 
distortions created on the commodity markets. As to the provision of public goods 
we extend recent results for a two class economy with public funds raised entirely by 
means of a non-linear income tax system. The standard Samuelson rule is modified 
by two additional terms related to the self selection constraint and to the revenue of 
indirect taxes. They are both shown to vanish when the agents’ utility functions are 
weakly separable between public and private goods (taken together) and leisure.
Chp 2: DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAX EVASION:A SURVEY OF THE 
LITERATURE
The purpose of this selective survey of the literature on both income and commodity 
tax evasion is to show in which directions, the literature has evolved. Two main 
approaches are identified for both direct and indirect tax evasion literature.
The so-called taxpayer’s point of view approach which is basically an exercise of 
maximization under uncertainty and the so-called tax collector’s point of view which 
is a refinement of the Mirrlees-Stiglitz approach to income taxation and of the 
Ramsey approach to commodity taxation. The current state of the art is such that both 
approaches share similar strengths and weaknesses.
Chp 3: TAX STRUCTURE, TAX REFORM AND TAX EVASION
In this paper we explore whether the shift from an ad valorem tax to a value added 
tax (which is a prerequisite to join the European Union) improves the "integrity” 
(number of people in the regular market) and the "efficiency" (total tax revenues) of 
the tax system. A model of two parallel (black and regular) markets is analyzed. The 
production in both the black and the regular market is divided in three stages: raw 
material, intermediate good and final good. Firstly, we prove that if an ad valorem 
tax is levied, at all stages of the regular market, any, even partial, tax reform towards 
VAT unequivocally increases integrity (the number of agents). Secondly, we prove 
that efficiency of the tax system is a direct function of its integrity. Therefore a tax 
reform from ad valorem to VAT seems justifiable under these two criteria. As a 
passing result, regular market consumers’ welfare is shown to increase.
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Chp 4. A NOTE ON CORRUPTION, PRODUCTION AND SHORTAGE IN 
USSR AND RUSSIA
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 argue that privatization increases production and reduces 
shortage; Komai, 1979 argues that privatization reduces both production and 
shortage. The transition from USSR to Russia reduced both production and shortage. 
We argue that this is just the result of the shrinking of the loss-making sector 
(industrial sector) and the expansion of the profit-making sector (the service sector 
and namely trade and retailing). We also argue that the validity of Komai’s model 
is limited to those firms which are overproducing (i.e. more than the profit 
maximization quantity) and the validity of Shleifer and Vishny’s model is limited to 
those firms which are underproducing. This reconciles two otherwise contradictory 
papers.
Chp 5: LABOUR MARKET REALLOCATION AND RENT-SEEKING IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMY
We present a simple two-sector model of the Russian labour market. Starting from 
a "full-employment" equilibrium with no search (the USSR), we analyze the path to 
the new equilibrium with unemployment and search (Russia). The links between the 
fraction of people searching, the wage differential and the hiring and firing 
probability of both sectors are investigated. A tentative way to compute these 
probabilities is proposed starting from recent (91-94) Russian data on unemployment 
and wages. It is shown that the wage differential across sectors rises with the 
strengthening of the entry barriers. It is argued that if no action is taken by the 
Authorities to fight unemployment and to reduce the wage differential across sectors 
(e.g. relaxing the entry barriers to the most productive sector), the market will react 
by developing, as an endogenous alternative to unemployment, a third sector which 
would act as a rent seeking one against the most productive sector. This will increase 
the outflow of workers from the least productive sector. Finally, it is shown that if 
the fraction of rent-seeking people attains a critical mass the above-mentioned policies 
may not be enough to rid the economy of the rent-seeking sector.
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Introduction
The first line of this thesis was written before Christmas 1991, the last line before 
Christmas 1995. During these four years the world has changed. A process which 
started in the end of the 80s developed to its full extent creating huge changes in 
many comers of the world. Some states have collapsed and split into several states 
through lengthy wars and riots, others through accords, others have changed their 
constitutions and the prerogatives of the parliament and the government, others have 
changed the balance between local and central powers. Some states have withdrawn 
from any interference in the economy, others have gone through massive privatization 
processes, others have given up their independent fiscal and monetary policy for 
financial help from international organizations. The role of the state has gone through 
a major rethinking. This phenomenon, which has both political and economic causes, 
has swept the world from East to West, from the developed to the developing 
countries.
Traditionally, public economists have justified state intervention in the economy using 
mainly the arguments of market failure, assertion of particular rights, and income 
distribution. The first argument has been used for the provision of pure (and even 
impure) public goods where the existence of externalities prevents the market 
achieving a socially optimal allocation. The second to provide some basic services 
(e.g. education and health-care) which are at the root of the equality of the initial
7
conditions, starting from which the competitive mechanism takes place. The third 
argument is politically sensitive and it has attracted the interest of maitres a penser 
of all ages. Plato in "The Laws" (IV c, B.C.) argued that a fair society should not 
allow the richest to be more than four times richer than the poorest; Nozick in 
"Anarchy, Utopia and State" (1974) argued that the state should not get involved in 
income distribution provided the fairness of the initial conditions is respected. 
Roughly speaking, to recognize a role for the state in income distribution is 
decreasingly accepted when political preferences move from left to right. This is 
tantamount to saying that the overall accepted level of state intervention in the 
economy decreases when moving from left to right.
During the last few years in most of the industrialized countries, political preferences 
have unambiguously shifted from left to right to an extent which was unthinkable 
only few years before. Public opinion has become more and more sensitive to the 
distortion introduced by inappropriate state intervention in the economy; there is a 
widespread tendency to interpret society as a market and to be suspicious of 
everything different from the free-market outcome. A deep world recession has made 
people more attentive to taxation and public expenditure. During this period, when 
an increased part of the workforce is living on welfare, and the social budget has 
been using up more resources, redistributive expenditures have become increasingly 
unpopular. Wastes and evident inequalities in the use of public funds mixed with 
subsidy distributions which benefits those who are not in need has undermined 
people’s confidence in their Governments. The extent of tax-evasion and the black
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sector economy which is present in most of economies is equally harmful to 
Government confidence. Moreover growing budget deficits have fuelled uncertainty 
about the future of the welfare state. The sum of these elements, among others, has 
induced public opinion to believe that the role of the state should be slimmed. While 
the overall level of state intervention is an ethical and political question which has to 
be decided upon by voters, the role of economic theory is to sketch the structure of 
public intervention and to facilitate its implementation ensuring that the economic 
system delivers both "equity and efficiency" that respects citizens’ preferences.
In many states of the previously so-called Socialist block, between Christmas 1991 
and Christmas 1995, dramatic and epoch-making changes have taken place. The 
Soviet Union disintegrated into a number of new, and to various degrees, independent 
republics. The command economy has been abandoned in order to move toward the 
market economy. Some parts of the centralized system have left to be replaced by 
decentralized one; overall the level of state intervention in the economy has 
dramatically diminished. The State is trying to construct a new institutional 
framework and to define its new role. For the time being, it could be said that in the 
transformation from the Soviet Union to Russia a totalitarian State has been replaced 
by a minimal-state. Actually it could be argued that the state has nearly lost even the 
function of night-watchman proper of a minimal state. Public opinion faced with this 
vacuum of power and with a high level of social inequality calls for a different 
structure of the role of the state and for a more tangible state presence in the
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economy and in the society. The urge for better laws, better regulation and for a 
thorough enforcement of them is tremendous. The feeling is that society cannot be 
left alone with a market practically without rules: a state regulating intervention is 
called for. This contrasts with what described above for most of the industrialized 
countries.
This thesis contributes to the debate with five different essays. The five essays are 
presented in the same order as I commenced to write them. I began the first paper 
in December 1991, the second in December 1992, the third in February 1993, the 
fourth in February 1994 and the fifth in June 1994. All papers have been terminated 
very much at the same time, between Summer and Autumn 1995. All essays deal 
with the same topic: the policy options left to the state, or more precisely the role of 
the state when confronted with a given situation. The "given situation" and the 
framework is very much different from one essay to another. The first addresses the 
question of the structure of state intervention in a general equilibrium model of a 
market economy. The second is a critical survey of the literature on tax evasion and 
hints to a new path of research in this field. The third takes stock of the result of the 
second and deals with tax evasion in the context of commodity taxes. The fourth one 
reconciles two apparently contradictory results of two well-known papers of transition 
economy, with the actual outcome, of the transition process from USSR to Russia. 
The fifth is a model of the labour market in a transition economy with an analysis of 
the future developments and the state policy options. Empirical data of the Russian
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economy are also presented and analyzed. This chapter somewhat takes stock of the 
previous chapters arguing that Russian tax compliance is too low to think of fiscal 
policy as an effective tool against inequalities and the feasibility and the effciacy of 
other measures have to be explored.
Chapter N. 1 Optimal Fiscal and Public Expenditure Policy in a Two Class Economy. 
This paper has a long story: it grew from my Master of Arts dissertation at the 
Universit6  Catholique de Louvain, on which I worked alone from December 1991 to 
September 1992. (Nava, 1992). From September 1992 to March 1993,1 refined some 
of the results presenting the final version at few PhD students’ seminars in Europe 
(namely at LSE, Core and Delta). This version is quoted by Guesnerie (1994). After 
that, Maurice Marchand, the supervisor of my Master of Arts dissertation, Fred 
Schroyen, another Ph.D student, and myself joined our efforts to widen and deepen 
it and this has resulted in the production of two different papers. A first paper has 
become the CORE DP 9321 while a second one, which I presented at the 1994 
Congress of the European Economic Association, is forthcoming (1996) on the 
Journal of Public Economics. The latter is presented in this thesis.
A standard two-class economy model of optimal taxation, in the Mirrlees-Stiglitz (i.e. 
Stiglitz (1982) adaptation to the discrete case of the Mirrlees analysis) tradition is 
adopted. At equilibrium, unemployment is ruled out and no tax evasion is possible. 
Optimal taxation and the provision of public goods are analyzed when the state levies 
non linear income and linear commodity taxes. This tax structure, which has been
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chosen for its empirical relevance, proves to be a useful analytical case. First the case 
for commodity taxation is made. On one hand, the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) result 
which states that commodity taxation is useless if agents* utility functions are weakly 
separable between public and private goods (taken together) and leisure is confirmed. 
On the other hand, when agents’ utility functions are not weakly separable, a policy 
implication for commodity taxation, exploiting the goods complementary 
(substitutable) with (for) leisure, is derived. The synergy between income taxation 
and commodity taxation is explored showing their respective roles to offset efficiency 
losses. Commodity taxation can possibly supplement income taxation to achieve 
equity results. As for the provision of public goods it is shown that the standard 
Samuelson Rule is modified by two additional terms related to the self selection 
constraint and to the revenue of indirect taxes. They are both equal to zero if the 
agents’ utility functions are weakly separable. The main result of this essay is the 
unambiguous role that commodity taxation may play, with respect to equity and 
efficiency goals, without necessarily increasing distortions. This should boost the 
confidence of the policy-maker: to use an instrument more intensively does not 
necessarily increase distortions.
Chapter N.2: Direct and Indirect Tax Evasion: A Survey o f The Literature.
The purpose of this selective survey of the literature on both income and commodity 
tax evasion, is to show in which directions the literature has evolved. Two main 
approaches are identified for both income and commodity taxation. The so-called
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taxpayer’s point of view approach, which is basically an exercise of maximization 
under uncertainty and the so-called tax collector’s point of view, which is a 
refinement of the Mirrlees-Stiglitz approach for direct taxation and of the Ramsey 
approach for indirect taxation. They both aim to optimize, from the taxpayer 
standpoint and the tax collector standpoint respectively, a given tax structure. Both 
approaches cannot answer the question: which commodity tax structure is more 
"honesty enforcing"? The model presented in the third chapters aims to provide an 
answer to this question.
Chapter N.3: Tax Evasion, Tax Reform and Tax Structure.
The third chapter takes for granted the results of the first and second chapter and 
aims to evaluate, in terms of integrity and efficiency of the tax system, the effect of 
a tax reform from ad valorem tax to value added tax. This type of reform is 
empirically very relevant, since the existence of the value added tax is a prerequisite 
for candidate countries to join the European Union. This requirement is usually 
justified, from an economic point of view, on the production efficiency ground since 
VAT, allowing inputs to enter the production function free of taxes, is neutral with 
respect to production decisions. Our aim is to show that this requirement has also a 
justification in terms of fiscal policy.
Two parallel markets, a black and a regular one, are described. Both the black and 
the regular market are divided into 3 stages of production: raw material, intermediate 
good and final good. We first show that a VAT system unequivocally increases the
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integrity of the tax system (i.e. the fraction of people operating in the regular market 
rather than in the black one) and second that the efficiency of the tax system (i.e. the 
total tax revenues collected) is a direct function of its integrity. Finally, as a passing 
result, we shall prove that a tax reform from add valorem commodity taxation to 
value added taxation is a welfare improvement for the "ever-honest" consumers since 
more goods are available at a lower price. The efficacy of the reform is a direct 
function of its amplitude: if the VAT system is introduced at all stages of the 
production process the effect is maximum, but even a partial reform is effective.
Chapter N.4: A note on Corruption, Production and Shortage in USSR and Russia. 
The fourth chapter enlarges the analysis from taxation in an abstract market economy 
to the role of the state in a transition economy. Following the suggestions of one of 
the greatest investigators of all times, Sherlock Holmes1, chapter 4 is a short note 
giving an overall description of the changes in production, shortage, corruption, 
wages and employment from the Soviet to the Russian system and relates them to the 
economic literature on the subject. We argue that the apparent Russian paradox of 
less production and less shortage was foreseen by two apparently contradictory papers 
and it is just the result of the contraction of the loss-making productive sector and the 
expansion of the profit-making service sector.
lMIt is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to 
twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to fit facts" (quotation from Mankiw, 
1994).
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Chapter N.5: Labour Market Reallocation and Rent-Seeking in Transition Economy. 
The last chapter presents a two-sector labour market model to show that the end state 
of transition, assuming rational behaviour of agents, is an equilibrium with 
unemployment and wage differential across sectors. The role of government policies 
to achieve equilibrium with the least possible unemployment and with socially 
acceptable wage differential is also discussed. We argue that the new growing sectors 
should play a crucial role in soaking up people fired by the old sectors and that 
Government intervention should be limited to the relaxation of entry barriers to the 
new sector. The challenges posed by the presence of an expanding rent-seeking sector 
are also analyzed.
The five chapters show my interest and my vision in the Theory and the Practice of 
Public Finance. I believe that a theoretical analysis of taxation and public expenditure 
in a general equilibrium model of the economy is a necessary condition to the 
understanding of the rationale for state intervention in a market economy. However, 
I also believe that the analysis should, wherever possible, take into account the 
empirical issues which make the model departing from its ideal form. Tax Evasion 
and Bad Regulation (or No Regulation at all) are those we have analyzed here.
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Abstract
This paper deals with optimal taxation and provision of public goods in a two-class 
economy with non linear income and linear commodity taxes. As far as optimal 
taxation is concerned, we first show that with two private goods the good 
complementary with leisure should be taxed more heavily. Second the standard 
income tax rules are shown to be augmented by considerations for offsetting the 
distortions created on the commodity markets. As to the provision of public goods 
we extend recent results for a two class economy with public funds raised entirely by 
means of a non-linear income tax system. The standard Samuelson rule is modified 
by two additional terms related to the self selection constraint and to the revenue of 
indirect taxes. They are both shown to vanish when the agents’ utility functions are 
weakly separable between public and private goods (taken together) and leisure.
Keywords: Non-linear income taxation, Public goods provision, Samuelson rule.
* This paper is a thoroughly revised and enlarged version of CORE Discussion 
Paper #9321 by the same authors (Nava et al 1993). The remarks made by two 
anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Furthermore, we wish to thank 
Roger Guesnerie, Pierre Pestieau, Heraklis Polemarchakis, Jean Pierre Zigrand and 
participants at the 1994 EEA Conference (Maastricht) for their comments. The usual 
disclaimers apply.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with a standard two-person two-good model of optimal taxation 
where the government cannot observe the agents’ ability and uses both income and 
commodity taxes for redistribution and public spending purposes. While the income 
taxes are non linear, commodity taxes are taken as linear to avoid any arbitrage 
opportunities, which means that their marginal rates can be differentiated across 
commodities but not across individuals. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, 
to analyze how tax rates on commodities should be set in this context and how 
marginal income taxes interact with commodity taxes; second, to derive the modified 
Samuelson rule that should apply for the optimal provision of a public good when the 
above tax instruments are used. 1
From Stiglitz (1982) it is a well known result that with income and commodity tax 
schedules which are both non linear, no marginal tax (direct or indirect) should be 
levied on the high-ability individuals. In contrast, the low-ability individuals’ income 
and consumption generally need both be taxed at the margin. This enables relaxation 
of the self-selection constraint. Those two results imply that commodity tax rates 
generally differ across the two classes of individuals. In the present paper they are 
forced to be identical, which makes our model different from Stiglitz (1982). 
Christiansen (1984) looks at the same issue with a continuum of types from the
1 Since the first draft of this paper was written we have learnt that Edwards, 
Keen and Tuomala were working on the same issues. Their work and ours, which 
have consistent results, have been carried out independently. Their final paper has 
been published as Edwards, Keen and Tuomala (1994).
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viewpoint of tax reform. Starting from an allocation with no commodity taxes (but 
with optimal non linear income taxes), his purpose is to determine welfare-improving 
directions for indirect taxes and subsidies. Also with a continuum of types, Tuomala 
(1990) derives optimal indirect tax rates. In the present paper, we concentrate on a 
finite class economy; this enables us to derive a formula for the optimal commodity 
taxes or subsidies that can easily be interpreted in terms of trade-off between the level 
of the deadweight losses and the relaxation of the self-selection constraint. Not 
surprisingly, the sign of the optimal tax is related to the complementarity or 
substitutability of the good with leisure (Proposition 1). We furthermore investigate 
how commodity taxes affect the optimal marginal rates of each individual’s income 
tax (Propositions 2 & 3).
Since the work of Pigou (1947), it is well known that if public goods are financed by 
distortionary taxes, their optimal provision must account for the excess burden of 
taxes. In their seminal article Atkinson and Stem (1974) have studied how the 
conventional Samuelson Rule must be modified when public funds are raised by 
linear income and linear commodity taxes. Boadway & Keen (1993) looked at the 
problem when public goods are financed through non-linear income taxation. In the 
present paper, we consider the realistic case where public expenditures are financed 
by non-linear income and linear commodity taxes. A key element is here the effect 
of public good provision on the self selection constraint and on commodity tax 
receipts. Sufficient conditions are provided for the standard Samuelson Rule to 
apply; they are related to some separability properties of the utility function between
19
leisure, private goods and public goods (Proposition 4). Analyzing those issues in 
the context of a finite-class economy makes it possible to draw clear-cut conclusions. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description of the 
model and to the derivation of the optimal policy rules. These are subsequently 
discussed in sections 3 (commodity tax rule), 4 (income tax rules) and 5 (public 
expenditure rule). In section 6  we shall draw some concluding comments.
2. The model
Our model aims to represent a production economy with two classes of individuals: 
nx workers with low ability (i= 1) and workers with high ability (/= 2 ) providing 
resp. w, and w2 efficiency units per hour of labour (where w2 > w j. Each agent shares 
the same monotonous and strictly concave utility function U( •) defined over amounts 
of foregone leisure (/), of two private commodities (xa and xb), and of one public 
good (G). We shall assume that the marginal rate of substitution of commodity b for 
leisure is a increasing function of foregone leisure (in a one commodity context this 
would guarantee normality of commodity b):
d (  — )UhAssumption N: ---- ^ — > 0 .o l
The competitive production sector transforms units of efficiency labour into units of 
private and public goods at rates which are constant and normalized to unity. This
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enables us to normalize the producer price of both private goods to unity. The real 
wage rate for a member of class i is therefore given and coincides with wf (i= 1 ,2 ). 
The government supplies individuals with the public good, and aims to guarantee low 
ability agents a welfare level which is higher than under no intervention. However, 
due to the absence of ex ante information on who is of which type, the financing of 
public goods and the establishment of a more equal welfare distribution is carried out 
by taxing labour income in a non-linear way and by taxing commodity purchases 
linearly. As shown by Guesnerie (1981) and Hammond (1987), this is the best way 
to proceed when private commodities are easily retradeable, either on perfectly 
competitive second-hand markets or through direct barter.
Let us consider an arbitrary non-linear income tax schedule. Facing this income tax 
schedule, an agent of type i will, through her labour supply, choose a point on this 
schedule as part of her optimising behaviour. At that point, we can define a virtual 
budget constraint by linearizing the after-tax budget constraint. That virtual budget 
line will have associated with it a marginal tax rate, tif and a lump sum component, 
Th both unique to the agent; let us call the pair (th T) the tax treatment o f gross 
labour income to an agent of type i. In our search for an optimal income tax policy, 
we may work with those two virtual budget constraints (one for each type of worker) 
and allow the government to choose individual-specific income tax treatments, 
provided that it ensures that no agent of one type has an incentive to apply for the 
income tax treatment intended for agents of the other type; that is, provided the 
income tax treatments satisfy the appropriate self-selection constraints. Having found
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the two optimal virtual budget lines, a non linear income tax schedule must be 
adjusted to induce agents to self-select their (separate) optimal allocations [as in 
Stiglitz (1982)].
Facing the income tax treatment (/,-, 7]) and the marginal commodity tax rates ja and 
Tb, an individual of type i solves the following problem:
where qa and qb stand for the consumer prices of commodities a and b, resp., which 
are equal to the producer prices plus the commodity taxes (viz qc= l + T c, c —a,b). 
Because profit income is zero, any feasible allocation in this economy which is 
implemented by a fiscal policy can also be implemented by means of a modified 
fiscal policy with one of the commodity tax rates normalized to zero. We will 
choose 7 b = 0  and henceforth commodity b shall be referred to as the numeraire. 
From the first order conditions of problem (1) we obtain the demand and supply 
functions, x la(T„thTi9G), x lb(T„thTiyG) and /,(r,,r£,7 .^,G), as well as the indirect utility 
function V(rA,tiyTiyG)y the derivatives of which provide Roy’s identities:
where at denotes agent z’s marginal utility of income and is agent Vs marginal 
willingness to pay for the public good, i.e. 7^ = ^  U lG /at.
max, < j
(i)
T /• *
K =~atw^
vL=-rr
(2)
Let us now inquire about the maximal utility level an agent of type 2 would derive 
when applying for the income tax treatment {tx,Tx) designed for type 1 agents, and 
how this utility level is affected by reforms in the fiscal and expenditure policy. 
Since the gross income of a type 1 individual is given by wxlx, agent 2, in order to 
mimic the pre-tax income of individual 1 , must supply a quantity of labour J2— 
wlll/w2 (henceforth, all variables pertaining to the mimicker will be written with an 
upper bar). With this amount of foregone leisure, the mimicking agent maximizes 
her utility with respect to xa and xb within the limits of the net disposable income (1- 
t\)W\l\-Tx. The resulting demand functions are given by ^f(ra,r1, r 1,G;/2) and 
x2b(TaA>Tx,G;l2); they imply the indirect utility function
(3)
the derivatives of which are:
(4)
where a2 and x2 stand for the mimicking agent’s marginal utility of income and 
marginal willingness to pay, respectively, and with
defJ a2w2
denoting the difference between the implicit marginal income tax rate which induces 
the mimicker to provide 12 hours of labour (1  + Ujlaw^) and the nominal tax rate 
Because the mimicker is forced to supply her labour at an exogenously determined 
suboptimal level (viz. wJi/w2), £ will in general be different from zero. In appendix 
A it is shown that assumption N is sufficient for £ to be positive. Decentralization 
requires that the utility level implied by (3) does not exceed the utility level 
^(Ta,t29T2tG).
Let us now turn to the government’s problem. It chooses a fiscal and expenditure 
policy which makes high productivity agents as well off as possible, while at the 
same time providing low productivity agents with a standard of living V\ above their 
welfare level under no intervention, and keeping its budget in balance. In other 
words, it solves
max(Vi,r,,G) ^ 2(Ta»^2»^ 2» ^
s.t. V \ t j v Tv G) ;> u] (v.)
^ ( V ^ G )  * (y) (6)w2
+ «2[ v £ ( ') +f2w2/2( )+r2] a G (A.)
The first constraint is the standard of living condition on low ability agents and the 
third constraint ensures a balanced government budget; the associated Lagrange
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multipliers are /* and X, resp., and both will be positive due to monotonicity of 
preferences. The second constraint is the self-selection condition on high ability 
agents. Its associated Lagrange multiplier 7  will take on a strictly positive value 
when the redistributional aim of the government (i.e. t/1) is sufficiently high. 2 
Manipulation of the first order conditions to problem (6 ) with respect to tu Tu t2,
T2 and G results in the following system of equations:3
2 A similar self-selection constraint imposing that an agent of type 1, when 
masquerading as a type 2  person, should not be able to derive a higher utility level 
than when applying for the income tax regime intended for type 1 , has been left out. 
First because under assumption N, at most one self-selection constraint will be 
binding. And second, because the government aims at guaranteeing type 1 agents a 
higher living-standard than under no intervention, the income tax treatment for this 
class will be relatively favourable, and therefore members of that class will never 
have any incentive to dissemble as high ability agents. (This is what Stiglitz (1982) 
refers to as the "normal" case.)
3 To derive these conditions we first obtain the first order conditions (foe) of (6 ), 
by equating to zero the derivatives of the associated Lagrangian w.r.t. the six 
decision variables. Next, we perform the following standard manipulations: (i): 
foc(tl)-wlll • fo c ^ )  =0; (z7) foc(t2)-w2l2*foc(T^)—0; (iii) foc(rJ-xi• foc(r,)-
xi • f o c ^  =0; and (zv) foe(G)+ •  foc(Ti)+ ir2 • foc(T2) =0. (7a) and (7b) then follow 
by simple rearrangement of (i) and (zi), resp.. (7c) and (7d) are obtained by 
substituting tx and t2 in {iii) and (zv) for the RHS’s of expressions (7a) and (7b) and 
rearranging.
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In these expressions, a tilde over a variable indicates a compensated effect. 4 Note 
also that the compensated effects in the large round brackets of expressions (7c) and 
(7d) are defined as
a xn 3x‘a d x j  dW'1,)1 dW'I,
(8)
(9)
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to the discussion of the policy rules (7a)-
3. Optimal linear indirect taxation and complementarity with leisure
The compensated price effect defined in (8) is the same as that derived by Neary and 
Roberts (1980) in the context of rationing (see their eq. 19); they call it the (own) 
compensated price effect on commodity a when there exists a quantity constraint on 
the labour market. Here the change in ra is accompanied by a change in t{ such that 
labour supply keeps constant. Like the Hicksian price effect, this one can easily be 
shown to be strictly negative under a strongly quasi-concave (and a fortiori under a 
strictly concave) utility function.5
5 Since the Slutsky matrix is then strictly negative definite, we have
(?d).
< 0 , for any nonzero vector [z^zj. This is true in particular
d w f dw lt [*,•
for z. = ■za , which implies that expression (8) is negative.
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Accordingly, by (7c), the optimal commodity tax rate, ra, has the same sign as (jt\- 
*1), which denotes the amount of commodity a which the mimicking type 2 agent 
consumes in excess of a type 1 agent. Since both agents earn the same gross income, 
they will also be left with the same amount of disposable income. On the other hand, 
the mimicking agent (being endowed with a higher ability) will be left with a larger 
amount of leisure than a type 1 agent, and this may induce her to allocate her 
disposable income in a different way. This suggests the use of the following
Definition: Assume both an exogenous amount o f disposable income and leisure are 
allocated to a consumer. A commodity is then said to be an l-complement (l- 
substitute) with leisure when that commodity is consumed in a larger (smaller) amount 
as more leisure becomes available.
Using the tools in Neary and Roberts (1980) it is possible to relate this commodity 
classification to standard income and substitution effects. In appendix B it is shown 
that commodity a is an 1-complement (substitute) with leisure if and only if individual 
preferences yield income and cross substitution effects which are related in the 
following way (cf eq B7):
dx dxh dx. d i /im
— h- <(>) - ± —± . (1 0 )
dT dt dT dt
In view of the homogeneity restriction {qa • dXaldt+dXbldt+ uja 'dl/dt= 0), it is not 
difficult to conclude from (10) that, together with normality of both commodities, 
Hicksian complementarity of commodity a with leisure (dXa/d t> 0) is a sufficient
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condition for this commodity to be an 1-complement with leisure.6
With the definition of 1-complementarity in mind, our first results can be stated as
follows:
Proposition 1: The tax on commodity a will be positive (negative) whenever
commodity a is an l-complement (l-substitute) with leisure.
Corollary 1: When commodity a is a Hicksian complement with leisure and with both 
private commodities being normal goods, ra will be positive.
As mentioned in the introduction, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) studied the case in 
which marginal commodity taxes may vary across both commodities and individuals 
(whereas we assume they may differ only across commodities). They conclude that 
no commodity taxes should be imposed on the high productivity person while those 
imposed on the low productivity one should vary across commodities according to 
their complementarity with leisure (there, complementarity is to be understood as the 
extent to which the marginal willingness to pay for a commodity increases with 
leisure). Whence, a sufficient condition for commodity taxation to vanish is weak
6 From (10), it is also clear that a necessary and sufficient condition for good 
a to be 1-independent with leisure is
dx dxa dx, dx. . dxa etc dx. dx. £/__£n-1 _ __£/__£\-l  £/_£\-l  ___£/__£\-l
dt dT dt dT dt dT dt dT
with the ratio’s in the expression to the left of the equivalence sign denoting the 
change in T  required to restore commodity demand to its original level after an 
marginal increase in t.
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separability in the utility function between leisure on the one hand and commodities 
on the other. A fortiori, the same condition remains sufficient when commodity tax 
rates are constrained to be uniform across agents. Indeed, when commodities are 
weakly separable from leisure, the allocation of disposable income over these 
commodities will be independent of the amount of leisure, and therefore xj=xj, 
implying r ,= 0.
For an economy with a continuum of types, Christiansen (1984) inquires about the 
desirability to introduce uniform marginal commodity taxes when an optimal income 
tax is in place. He finds that the introduction of a commodity tax (subsidy) will 
entail a welfare improvement when that commodity is "negatively (positively) related 
to labour", a commodity classification which precisely coincides with our 1- 
complementarity (1-substitutability). In this respect, Proposition 1 is an obvious 
translation of the rules derived by Christiansen (1984) and Tuomala (1990) to a two- 
class economy. The advantage, however, of the present framework is that the 
optimal tax formula (7c) can be given a transparent cost-benefit interpretation.
First, note that taxing a good which is an 1-complement with leisure relaxes the self­
selection constraint: this effect is caught by the RHS of (7c). To see this, let us rise 
r. by At. (>0) and simultaneously reduce 7j by ATi=-x[ATt (/=1,2). These reforms 
do not affect the utility of either type of non-mimicking individuals; the mimicker is 
however worse off. To keep her at the same level of satisfaction would require a 
lump sum tax rebate of x^Ar,; so her utility falls by a(jtJ-xl)Art, thereby relaxing the 
self-selection constraint. However, raising r. causes further distortions in the price
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system; its effect on the deadweight loss is caught by the LHS of (7c).
The explanation for the use of a labour constrained substitution effect in the 
measurement of the deadweight loss is the following. What the non-linear income 
tax schedule does in the quantity space [as in Stiglitz (1982)] is to make two distinct 
combinations of gross and disposable income available. (As a matter of fact, the 
virtual budget constraints, together with the self selection constraint exactly replicate 
this.) Any agent may select any of these combinations, but the choice is clearly a 
non-marginal one. The presence of the labour constrained substitution effects on the 
LHS of (7c) indicates that, as the indirect tax system is marginally changed, the agent 
is unable to respond to this change by a marginal adjustment of her labour supply 
(and hence of her gross income). Consequently, the resulting reallocation of her full 
disposable income will be as if a quantity constraint on labour supply applies. 
Therefore, formula (7c) yields the optimal trade-off between the level of deadweight 
loss and the relaxation of the self-selection constraint, and focuses on commodity a 
only.
Finally, it is interesting to compare our commodity tax rule with the one provided by 
Mirrlees (1975, eq 9). In that paper, Mirrlees shows that in a two class economy 
where a fully linear tax system is operated, Pareto efficiency requires the following 
equalities to hold (in our notation, and with the uniform marginal income tax denoted 
by t):
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(11)
where the positive factor of proportionality is the net social marginal value of subsidy 
to class 1. When comparing tax rule (7c) with (11) for ra, x\ has been replaced by 
xj, and tx and t2 have been substituted for the common value t. Apart from these 
changes, there is a strong similarity between the two commodity tax rules. The 
difference (xj-xj) on the RHS of the Mirrlees tax formula represents the benefit of a 
better targeting: per ’unit’ of reform Ara, the government can establish a lump sum 
rebate to the value of the average amount consumed of commodity a. When type 2 
agents consume above the average, such a reform is to the advantage of the other 
class, and should be pursued until it is offset by the deadweight loss. Under 
normality of consumption, high ability agents will also be high income earners, and 
thus linearity of the income tax schedule shifts the focus from 1-complementarity with 
leisure to the degree of luxury in the decision whether to tax or subsidize a 
commodity.
4. The relationship between marginal income and commodity taxes 
In this section we explore the marginal rate of income tax imposed on the two types 
of individuals and analyze how these tax rates interact with commodity taxes, whether 
the latter are set optimally or not.
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Let us first look closer into the marginal income tax rate to which high ability types 
are subjected. As pointed out by Tuomala (1990, p 175) and Edwards et al (1994), 
it is a property of the optimal tax system that the total tax liability of an high ability 
individual should remain unaffected by a marginal increase in this individual’s labour 
earnings.7 An equivalent interpretation would be that the government does not 
collect any extra tax revenue when augmenting the marginal income tax rate in a 
compensated way (i.e. by appropriately adjusting the lump sum tax treatment); this 
is easy to see by rewriting (7b) as re• b^Jbt2 + t2*dw2Vdt2 =0.
According to Stiglitz (1982), no marginal tax ought to be imposed on the labour 
income of the high ability agent, when direct and indirect taxes can both be non­
linear. Note that in our setting, the same result (t2=0) applies if the agents’ utility 
functions are weakly separable between all consumption goods and leisure. No 
commodity taxes are then required, which implies that t2=0 from (7b).
In general, however, a non-zero marginal income tax at the top is motivated by the 
existence of efficiency losses created by indirect taxation. Distortionary income 
taxation (or subsidization) will be desirable to the extent that it offsets these efficiency 
losses. Let us inquire how marginal income taxes should be set. As the denominator 
on the RHS (7b) is always positive, we infer that t2 is positive or negative according 
to whether the signs of the commodity tax on good a and that of the cross substitution 
effect dX2Jdt2 are identical or opposite.
Assume without loss of generality that ra>0. If good a is a substitute for leisure in
7 Edwards et al (1994) speak of a zero effective marginal tax rate.
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the Hicks sense (d&Jdt2< 0), it becomes optimal to subsidize high ability agents* 
labour income at the margin (t2 <  0). Such subsidization tends to decrease leisure and 
consequently more of good a will be demanded. Whence, t2 is chosen in such a way 
that its effect on counteracts that of the commodity tax on good a. On the other 
hand, when good a is a complement for leisure in the Hicks sense (d;?Jdt2>0), t2 will 
take on a positive sign. Taxation of income at the margin tends to increase leisure 
and consequently more of good a will be demanded. Once again the effects of 
income and commodity taxes on oppose each other. (With the appropriate changes 
in sign the same kind of conclusions can be reached when the consumption of good 
a is subsidized.) Note that those conclusions hold irrespective of whether Ta>0 is 
optimal.
When also the commodity tax policy is part of the optimization exercise, we know 
that the direction in which this policy should distort commodity demand is controlled 
by the commodity’s degree of 1-complementarity with leisure. Hence the following 
result:
Proposition 2: Under a Pareto efficient fiscal policy, the marginal tax on the income 
o f the high productivity individual has the same (opposite) sign as that on commodity 
a as long as leisure and good a are complements (substitutes) in the Hicks sense.
Corollary 2: When commodity a is a Hicksian complement with leisure, and with 
both private commodities being normal goods, t2> 0.
Let us now focus on the optimality condition w.r.t. tx. From condition (7a), it
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transpires that distortive taxation of low incomes is motivated by two reasons. The 
standard reason, accounted for by the second RHS term in (7a), is that it mitigates 
the incentive of high ability agents to masquerade as low ability ones. But as we 
have argued in the previous section, this motivation also underlies the indirect tax 
policy. Because this policy distorts the decisions of low ability agents to purchase 
commodity a, the alleviation of the ensuing efficiency losses provides a second 
rationale for distortive taxation of low incomes. Of course, in the absence of 
commodity taxes, such efficiency losses are zero, and tl is positive for the standard 
reason.
Let us now turn to the sign of tx and make the following rather weak assumption:
Assumption I: The sign o f the compensated marginal income tax effect on the 
demand for commodity a is independent o f the income level.
Because under this hypothesis the first term on RHS of (7a) has the same sign as the 
RHS of (7b) and because the second term is positive under the normality assumption 
N, tx > 0 is a necessary condition for t2 > 0. Under an optimal commodity tax policy, 
the same conditions of corollary 2 which are sufficient to have tj> 0  are also 
sufficient for ^ > 0 . On the other hand, the simultaneous occurrence of marginal 
income taxation of low ability persons (tx > 0) with marginal income subsidization of 
high ability persons (t2 < 0) cannot be ruled out a priori. But this requires commodity 
a to have an opposite preference characterization in the two senses. Under normality 
of both commodities, the only opposite characterization possible is Hicksian
substitutability and /-complementarity with leisure, which is therefore a necessary 
condition on preferences for income subsidization of low ability types (tx < 0) to be 
optimal. Our findings in this section are summarized in the following proposition and 
its corollary.
Proposition 3: Under a Pareto efficient fiscal policy, tx> 0 is a necessary condition 
for t2> 0.
Corollary 3: Under normality o f both commodities, a necessary condition fo r  t, < 0  
to be optimal is that commodity a is both a Hicksian substitute and an l-complement 
with leisure.
5. The Samuelson rule with non-linear income and linear commodity taxes 
In this section we interpret the modified Samuelson rule as given by expression (7d).
This expression holds even if the commodity tax is not set at its optimal level. For 
the sake of interpretation let us consider first the case in which no commodity taxes 
are levied (ra=0). Under this (possibly Pareto inferior) indirect tax policy, the RHS 
of (7d) reduces to unity, generating the modified Samuelson rule derived by Boadway 
and Keen (1993). The modification is due to the presence of the term ya 2(Ti-T^)l\ 
which accounts for the impact the public expenditure policy may have on the self­
selection constraint. If the mimicker has the same marginal willingness to pay for 
the public good as individual 1, the standard Samuelson rule obtains (7z1x1+n2T2:=l), 
even though public expenditure is financed through distortive (non-linear) income 
taxation.
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Again, a transparent cost-benefit interpretation can be provided. Suppose that 
initially the planner chose public expenditure according to the standard Samuelson 
rule. Let us then rise G by one unit and at the same time increase Tx and T2 by t x 
and x2 respectively (AG=1, ATl=irl and Ar2= x 2). These budget-balancing changes 
keep both individuals 1 and 2 on their original indifference curves, but they will 
affect the utility of the mimicking agent (and therefore the self selection constraint) 
to the extent that xr x2 is different from zero. Consider, for instance, the case where 
x2< xx. Then under this hypothetical policy reform the mimicker is made worse off 
since Tx rises by more than she is willing to pay for. In this case, the self selection 
is relaxed by expanding public good provision and formula (7d) (with the RHS = 1) 
indicates that the public good ought to be provided at a level where the aggregate 
marginal willingness to pay falls short o f  the marginal cost (cf proposition 1 of 
Boadway & Keen, 1993). Thus with x25*xj, the public expenditure policy affects 
the income transfer policy through its effect on the self-selection constraint. A case 
where such an effect will not occur is where the agents’ utility functions are weakly 
separable between all private and public goods (taken together) and leisure, i.e. 
U(xa,xb,l,G)=u[F(xajcb,G),l\. Then the marginal willingness to pay for the public 
good is the same for all agents consuming the same commodity bundle, even when 
they supply a different amount of labour (in particular x ^ x * ). In that case, the 
standard Samuelson rule for public good provision continues to apply (cf Boadway 
& Keen, 1993, Corollary 1). The above results hold even with zero indirect 
taxes not being optimal. In the case where these taxes differ from zero, equation (7d)
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can be given the same interpretation as in the case without indirect taxes except that 
the impact on indirect tax revenue of a change in G needs to be accounted for as 
well. This is done through the compensated effects on consumption decisions of the 
change in G. Note, however, that as in section 3 the labour supply (and therefore 
gross income) of both types of individuals kept constant by means of simultaneous 
changes in f, and t2 (see eq 9).
It is interesting to compare our modified Samuelson formula with the one obtained 
by Atkinson and Stem (1974) for the case where (linear) commodity taxes and an 
optimal linear income tax are used. As reported in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) it 
can be written as:
n1TZ1+n2TZ2+(n1 +n2)cov(bi,T:i)=l -x t
dxa dxa
n, +tin----
1 dG ^dG
(12)
where bt is the net social marginal valuation of individual i’s income, viz. b ^ a fk -  
T^bxiJdTi. Thus, under optimal linear income taxation, the distribution covariance 
term focuses on the way the willingness to pay for the public good is related to bt and 
hence to income. Under optimal wo/i-linear income taxation, the equivalent term 
rather focuses on the relationship between the willingness to pay and available 
leisure. In addition, the terms accounting for the effect on tax revenues of the change 
in G in formulas (7d) and (12) are somewhat different since the former involves the 
impact on tax revenue of the changes in tx and t2 required to keep lx and l2 constant. 
We can now wonder under which circumstances our modified Samuelson rule reduces 
to the standard rule if the indirect tax parameters are set optimally. From section 3
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we know that if the utility function is weakly separable between labour and all private 
consumption goods (taken together), then no commodity taxation need be employed. 
Both the utility functions U[F(xarxb),G,l] and U[F(xayxb,G),l] meet this requirement; 
they will both make commodity taxation redundant. While the latter function also 
makes 7r2=7ri (see earlier), the former does not, in which case mitigating effects on 
the self-selection constraint will affect public goods provision as well. With 
preferences representable by the latter utility function, neither indirect taxation nor 
the provision of the public good will give rise to such mitigating effects, so that the 
level at which the public good should be supplied is to be derived from the standard 
Samuelson rule:8
Proposition 4: Under a Pareto-efficient indirect and direct tax policy, a sufficient 
condition for the standard Samuelson formula to apply is that the agent's utility 
functions are weakly separable between leisure and all private and public goods taken 
together.
6. Concluding comments
In this paper we enquired about Pareto efficient fiscal and public expenditure policies 
for a discrete class economy where the government cannot directly observe the 
individuals’ abilities and where indirect tax rates are constrained to be uniform across 
individuals for reasons of arbitrage. By assuming a high and low ability class, and
8 Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 of Christiansen {1981) give, with reference to 
the continuum case, a result similar to our Proposition 4.
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by restricting the number of private commodities to two, the problem has been 
formulated in the simplest possible way.
As far as the optimal tax policy is concerned, two conclusions have been derived. 
First, we showed that if a good is more complementary with leisure than the 
numeraire, it should be taxed at a higher rate at the margin. Second, a marginal 
increase of the respective marginal income tax should result in a zero tax extraction 
from the high ability individual and positive extraction for the low ability individual. 
These are results which are consistent with the existing literature and economic 
intuition.
However we also showed that the value of the optimal marginal income tax rate on 
high incomes is chosen so as to partially offset the efficiency losses from indirect 
taxation. This leads to a synergy between the marginal income tax rate and the 
commodity tax rate, in that the former should be chosen so as to counteract the 
effects of the latter on consumption decisions. In particular we identified Hicksian 
complementarity of the non-numeraire commodity with leisure together with 
normality of both private goods as sufficient conditions for a positive indirect tax rate 
and a positive marginal tax rate on high incomes to obtain. Besides its potential for 
relaxing the self-selection constraint, the marginal income tax rate on low incomes 
is chosen for similar reasons of counteractions.
As to the optimal provision of public goods we put together two results of the 
literature. The first appeared in Atkinson and Stem (1974) where a fully linear 
income and commodity tax system is implemented, and the second in Boadway and
40
Keen (1993) where only non-linear income taxes are in force. We derived a modified 
Samuelson formula for a hybrid tax structure. If the agents* utility function are 
weakly separable between private and public goods (taken together) and leisure, the 
standard Samuelson rule was shown to apply again.
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Appendix A
Like in Christiansen (1984) we can consider the consumer’s problem as a two-stage 
process. In the second stage, the consumer allocates a net disposable income z, 
conditional upon the fact that a gross income wl has been earned by supplying / hours 
of labour. The solution to this problem may be inserted into the utility function to 
U( •) to provide a new utility function defined over z and /, u(z,l), which again shares 
all the desirable properties (the proof is analogous to the one given by Bronsard, 
1983). In the first stage, the consumer then chooses values for z and I which 
maximize u(z,l) subject to the relationship between gross and net income as defined 
by the income tax schedule. In absolute value, the marginal rate of substitution in 
the (z,0-space is given by -w/mz>0. Whence, net disposable income z is a normal 
good if
-u,
^  (AD
 z—  > 0
a/
It is not too difficult to demonstrate that the normality assumption N in the 
text will precisely guarantee this.
Suppose now that, facing the income tax treatment (tu Tj), the low ability 
agent chooses to supply lx hours of labour in the first stage. To apply for the same 
tax treatment, the high ability agent should supply only /2=w1/1/w2 hours of work. 
When the inequality (Al) is verified, this means that facing the income tax treatment 
(f,,7i), this agent would like to supply more than ^ hours (see figure 1). In other 
words, at the bundle (S\-t^wxlx-Tul^, the mimicking agent’s supply price for labour 
is lower than her market wage rate w2. Put differently, the implicit marginal tax rate 
inducing the mimicking agent to supply /2 hours exceeds tx.
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Appendix B
Consider a consumer who disposes of a lump sum income m, who faces the price qa 
for the non-numeraire commodity a, and who is forced to supply 1° hours of labour 
at a net wage rate w because of a quantity constraint on the labour market.
The demand system under these circumstances of rationing can be written as 
x£(qa,(j),m;r) (k=a,b). If the unconstrained demand system written as xk( •) (k=a,b), 
the former system may be related to the latter in the following way: 
xrk(qa,u,m;r)=xk[qa,co° ,m +(u-u°)r] where o>° denotes the consumer’s reservation 
wage at which she would like to supply exactly 1° hours of labour.
When the consumer is forced to supply an extra dl° hours of labour, the effect on the 
demand for commodity a can be shown to decompose into an income and a 
substitution effect:
(B l)
dm dl°
which can be related to standard income and substitution effects (see Neary and 
Roberts, 1980):
<K = (B2)
dm dm do) do dm
aoi - (B3>
d r da da
with the standard effects evaluated at that parameters [^J,co°,m+(cj-aj0) /0].
The homogeneity restriction on the consumer’s decisions, implies that
dxn dx, si
a — 2 + — =  0, (B4)
do) dco do
thereby providing the following implicit definition of the reservation wage co°:
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When a consumer is forced to supply an extra dl° hours of labour but when her lump 
sum income is adjusted by -ox//° to give her the same disposable income as before, 
demand for commodity a adjusts by
(B6)
Making use of (B2), (B3) and the adding up property on the constrained demand 
system (viz qa*8xrJ8 m+djt£/0m=l), and in view of the positivity of the own 
substitution effect on labour supply (81/do) >0), it follows that demand for 
commodity a will go up (down) when
and vice versa when /° falls (more leisure available). Substituting 8%b/8w out of (B7) 
by means of (B4), one obtains
Thus, under normality of both commodities, Hicksian complementarity of 
commodity a with leisure (8xjdo)<0) will guarantee a reduced demand for that 
commodity if less leisure becomes available (i.e. will guarantee /-complementarity 
with leisure).
If in (B7) an equality sign obtains, rearrangement and use of the Slutsky equation 
8XJ8o)=dxjd u-dxjd m • / ° (c=a,b) results in
dxb dxi
-  >(<)
3 * 0  5xb (B7)
dm do dm 0o>
(B8)
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Chapter 2
DIRECT AND INDIRECT TAX EVASION: 
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE*
Mario Nava 
Center for Economic Performance 
London School o f Economics
Abstract
The purpose of this selective survey of the literature on both income and commodity 
tax evasion is to show in which directions, the literature has evolved. Two main 
approaches are identified for both direct and indirect tax evasion literature.
The so-called taxpayer’s point of view approach which is basically an exercise of 
maximization under uncertainty and the so-called tax collector’s point of view which 
is a refinement of the Mirrlees-Stiglitz approach to income taxation and of the 
Ramsey approach to commodity taxation. The current state of the art is such that both 
approaches share similar strengths and weaknesses.
* Thanks are due to Jonathan Leape who introduced me to the subject and helped 
with the revision of a first version and to all participants of the LSE PhD seminars 
1993/94 for their comments. Comments from Tim Besley and Mick Keen have been 
very useful in polishing the final version. The usual disclaimers apply.
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1. Introduction
After the excellent Frank Cowell (1990) review to write a survey about tax evasion 
is a very hard job, at least for the next few years. The aim of this survey is just to 
fill a possible gap in Cowell’s book. We present a comparative approach to the 
literature on direct and indirect tax evasion. The literature on tax evasion is 22 years 
old and contains roughly 210 papers. About 200 papers deal with direct tax evasion, 
while the other 10 papers deal with indirect tax evasion. The difference in the number 
of papers in the two areas is rather impressive and the topic of indirect tax evasion 
seems to have been rather neglected in the last twenty years. However it is an area 
of great theoretical and empirical importance especially in the European Union where 
a greater harmonization of the system of indirect taxation is high on the agenda.
We will stress many similarities between the two literatures. Both in the direct and 
indirect tax evasion literature one may find two different approaches. The taxpayer’s 
perspective approach and the social perspective approach. We will comment on the 
paper that we think to be the most representative in both approaches and in both 
direct and indirect tax evasion literature. However, we will not give up the ambition 
to supply the reader with an historical perspective. Actually the four chosen papers 
in addition to being the most representative of their respective stream of literature, 
are the first on each topic.
The problem of tax avoidance is left out of this essay and we shall make clear the 
difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance. From a legalistic point of view
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"avoidance" means to avoid tax legally, i.e. following the suggestions of a clever tax 
adviser in filling in the tax declaration, while "evasion" means to avoid tax illegally 
via e.g. under reporting. From an economic point of view, which concerns us more, 
if the taxpayer practices "tax avoidance" he1 will stay in a world of certainty about 
his post tax income; if he practices "tax evasion" he will shift in the world of 
uncertainty: his actual post tax income will depend on the event of being checked and 
recognized as tax evader which is an event having probability p ( 0 < p < l ) .  The 
evader takes decisions under uncertainty. These two definitions may lead an 
economist and a lawyer to think differently about the same action. If there exists a 
kind of tax evasion with no probability of being caught, for an economist this is just 
tax avoidance and for a lawyer this is tax evasion. One could argue that evasion with 
no probability of being caught is tax evasion also from an economic point of view, 
but it is just a type of tax evasion not represented in the existing models. 
Nevertheless a rational taxpayer would never comply with the law if tax evasion were 
risk-free. Therefore in order to include the risk-free tax evasion in a model of 
rational behaviour one need to reshape the standard notion of rationality. In other 
words under the standard notion of rationality individual’s integrity depends on 
individual’s risk aversion. However for our purposes the economic definition is the 
one to keep in mind.
1 Since we are speaking about cheaters and since we are willing to describe 
models having a strong empirical validity, all cheaters are thought to be ..men!
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we look at the famous and seminal 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) (taxpayer’s perspective approach to direct tax evasion) 
and at Sandmo (1981) (social perspective approach to direct tax evasion). In Section 
3, we will focus on the papers of Marrelli (1984) (taxpayer’s perspective approach 
to indirect tax evasion) and Cremer and Gahvari (1993) (social perspective approach 
to indirect tax evasion). Section 4 concludes.
2. Direct Tax Evasion
In this section we will present two well-known papers on income tax evasion. The 
first one is the first article ever appeared in the literature on tax evasion and it adopts 
the taxpayer’s perspective approach. The second one adopts the social perspective 
approach.
2.1 The Taxpayer's Perspective Approach and Direct Tax Evasion 
Just looking at the few references of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), one immediately 
realizes why it is unanimously considered the path-breaking article on tax evasion: 
there is no previous paper dealing with this topic with the exception of a mimeo by 
Mirrlees, quoted in their footnote 1, which suggested theoretical investigation of the 
matter. Their paper takes into account only the possibility of income tax evasion and 
connects two different approaches: on one hand the so-called economics of criminal 
activity (Becker 1968) on the other hand the analysis of optimal portfolio and risk 
insurance (Arrow (1^70), Mossin (1968a, 1968b) and Stiglitz (1969). Tax evasion is
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regarded as a matter of risk bearing and the paper provides the analytical background 
for most of the following papers on the subject. We will see that many ideas 
developed in later articles were already present in Allingham and Sandmo.
The "cheater" is, in their paper, a perfectly rational taxpayer who maximises his 
expected utility. Utility depends only on income (which is exogenous) and he faces 
the choice to declare all his total income, paying a tax rate t on it, or to act as a 
criminal and declare for fiscal purposes just a fraction a. If his criminal behaviour 
will be discovered (the event "to be caught" has a probability p, where 0 < p  < 1) then 
he will pay a penalty rate 0 on the amount evaded. The amount of penalty is such that 
if discovered he will be worse off than if he were honest, if not discovered he will 
be better off than if he were honest. Therefore the cheater will choose that a 
maximising the following2:
Max E(U) =( 1  - p )  U(W-taW) +pU(W-taW-Q(W-aW) ) (1)
a
w h e r e :
W-taW=Y: in c o m e  i f  e v a s i o n  i s  n o t  d i s c o v e r e d ,  ( la )
W-taW-Q (W-aW) =Z: in c o m e  i f  e v a s i o n  i s  d i s c o v e r e d  ( l b ) .
Solving the first order conditions one finds the two conditions for an interior solution:
U'(W)p0> t p + { l - p )  —
T V  i
( 2 )
U'(W( 1 - t )  ) 
p0< t  (3)
2 Each of the 4 reviewed papers has, of course, a different notation. In order to 
gain the benevolence of the reader(s?) not only we have adopted an uniform notation 
for each paper, but also we put a Legend at the end of the paper where all symbols 
are explained, instead of explaining them after each new equation.
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Since the RHS of Eq. (2) is at most equal to the RHS of Eq. (3) and since both are 
positive there is an interval of positive parameter values which will guarantee an 
interior solution. Eq. (3) is readily interpretable: the taxpayer is a tax evader only in 
the case that the expected penalty rate is less than the tax rate. The fraction in Eq. 
(2) gives the decrease in marginal utility (so the gain in utility) from not paying taxes 
honestly (e.g. [U'(W)/U'(W(l-t))]=0.5 means that your post tax marginal utility is 
double than your pre-tax marginal utility): clearly, as higher is W as closer the 
fraction is to 1 (keeping t constant). This means that the interval for partial evasion 
is smaller for "richer" (or large firms) than for "poorer" (or small firms), so it could 
be concluded that poorer are more likely to evade. But we shall come back to it later. 
If the taxpayer cares not only about money but also about reputation (as hopefully 
everyone does) the utility function should be modified to include reputation in state 
0 (evasion but no detection, income Y) and state 1 (evasion and detection, income Z). 
Again note that this individual is not worried about the fact of being honest or not, 
but just about the fact of being recognized as a honest man or not. The best state for 
him is being dishonest faking of being honest. A very vulgar man. The taxpayer now 
maximises:
Max E(U)  = ( l - p )  U ( Y , s 0) + p U { Z , s 1) (4)
a
Assuming U(Y,  s 0) >U(Y,  s x) one obtains, solving the first order conditions, the 
equivalent condition to Eq. (3):
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p 0 < t
. U*(W(l- t)  , s 0)
p + ( l - p ) — — ------   (5)
r f i W i l - t )  ' S x)
The RHS of Eq. (5) is less than the RHS of Eq. (3) since (U’OV O-O^/U’OVO- 
t),Sj) is less than one. So as greater these reputation effects are on the utility function, 
as smaller is the interval for evasion which is left to the taxpayer. In the extreme 
case, where the individual cannot bear the dishonour of being recognized as an 
evader, the marginal utility under state 1 will be infinite and Eq. (5) will reduce to 
6< t. This makes the taxpayer not evading, because any rational Ministry of Finance 
chooses $ such that 0>t.  If on the contrary the utility function of the taxpayer is 
slightly affected by Sq or s,, Eq.(5) is not so different from Eq.(3).
Allingham and Sandmo derived also five results of comparative analysis:
daW/dW >0 (6) ( i f  0 ^ 1 ) ,  b u t
da/dW  ? (7)
d a W /d t  ? (8)
daW/dQ >0 (9)
daW/dp  >0 (10)
Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) clarify the common belief that large firms (or rich people) evade 
less. Actually, under absolute decreasing risk aversion, rich people evade less in the 
sense that the absolute amount of tax paid is greater among "richer" than among 
"poorer" (pretty obvious they are richer, they earn more, they should pay more taxes 
than the poorer!). But, this does not necessarily mean that richer people are more 
honest: as a matter of fact is impossible to say if the fraction a  (that is a proxy for
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honesty) increases or decreases with income (Eq. 7), unless one makes assumptions 
on the individual relative risk aversion.
The ambiguity on the sign of Eq. (8 ) depends upon the income and the substitution 
effect: the income effect is positive, if more taxes are levied, the taxpayer is poorer 
and under decreasing absolute risk aversion he reduces evasion; the substitution effect 
is negative because an increase in tax rate makes more profitable, at the margin, to 
evade.
Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) are intuitive and tied to the rationality of economic agents. 
The paper ends with the analysis of the optimal behaviour of a forward looking 
taxpayer in a dynamic setting. The crucial hypothesis is that if the taxpayer is 
discovered as an evader he must pay a penalty, not only on taxes evaded in the 
present year, but also on all he has evaded since the time when he last paid the full 
amount. Therefore the rational taxpayer realizes that the today’s decision of cheating 
must be influenced by past tax declarations (which determines the penalty) and in turn 
it will influence the future. It can be shown that for this rational and forward looking 
taxpayer even if it is possible to have an initial and partial evasion it will arrive a 
time T from when on he will no more evade. This last result that, even if people are 
not honest, but just rational, is possible to find a kind of penalty such that paying 
taxes is optimal, is, in our opinion, extremely important.
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) treats the tax evasion issue as the individual choice of 
utility maximisation under uncertainty, ’’...[they] explain to us how they choose to 
fill in their income tax declaration" Kolm (1973). We do think that this approach is
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extremely interesting from the individual point of view, but at the same time we do 
agree with the comment of Kolm (1973): "But this is hardly public economics; in 
fact, it is very private. What is really public economics is their tax collector’s 
viewpoint."
A second stream of literature focuses on the "public economics" standpoint in the 
sense of the above quoted Kolm’s sentence. The main reason for us to be concerned 
with the social perspective lies in the peculiarity of fiscal frauds. A great majority of 
other illegal activities involving money can be classified as acts against the law of 
private property and generically an act against an individual or an institution. If I rob 
a bank I am breaking the law which says that bank’s money are not mine or to a 
larger extent that exists a right of private property over money that needs to be 
respected. If I am evading taxes, e.g. simply not stating in my income tax declaration 
part of my earnings, I am stealing money to Tax Collector Authority (the 
Government). Being Government’s wealth made up of everyone’s contributions this 
is an act against all fellow citizens and generically against the society. Analyzing tax 
evasion seems therefore appropriate to take a social perspective standpoint and to see 
how tax evasion affects government ability of raising taxes. As a matter of fact tax 
evasion may be conceived both linked to some illegal activity (I live robbing banks 
and I do not declare my earnings to the Tax Authorities) and linked to perfectly legal 
activities (I run a shop and I underreport my revenues).
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2.2 The Social Perspective Approach and Direct Tax Evasion 
The first paper adopting this approach is Sandmo (1981). His paper deals with 
income taxes and connects the economics of criminal activity literature with the 
optimal taxation literature, that had at those days already reached substantial results 
(Mirrlees 1971, Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976). In his paper Sandmo distinguishes 
between non evaders (n) and evaders (e) and focuses in particular on labour supply 
elasticities to tax rates as it was suggested by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
As far as the former group, the standard optimal taxation theory with homogeneous 
individuals applies. The non evader individual maximises:
Max Un=U(Xn, L n) (11)
X n, L n
S.  t :  X n=wnL n ( l - t )  +T (12)
And after solving the first order conditions we may derive the indirect utility 
function:
Vn= V { t , T )  (13)
As far as the evaders the utility function is modified as follows:
U6=U( X0, L e+E) (14)
The amount of hours worked into the regular market is known to the authorities, 
while the amount of hours worked into the irregular market is unknown unless an
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investigation is made. If an investigation is made, the evader is immediately 
discovered and convicted to pay tax at a penalty rate $ of the amount evaded. The 
budget constraint is therefore different in the two possible states of the world:
e v a s i o n  n o t  d i s c o v e r e d :  s t a t e  0 
Y e=weL e ( 1 - t )  +T+weE  (15)
e v a s i o n  d i s c o v e r e d : s t a t e  1 
Z e=weL e ( 1 - t )  +T+weE ( l - Q )  (16)
Therefore the evader is assumed to maximise an expected utility:
Ue= ( l - p )  U ( Y e , L e+E) + p U( Ze , L e+E) (17)
whose maximisation results lead to the indirect utility function:
V6= V ( t , T , Q , p )  (18)
As usual it is assumed that the State maximises the Social Welfare Function (SWF), 
the sum of the indirect utility functions, subject to the budget constraint. Within this 
framework two main questions may be addressed: 1) how the optimal tax rate 
changes depending on tax evasion and 2 ) which is the optimal relationship between 
probability of detection and penalty.
As far as the first question is concerned, after some standard derivations one arrives 
to the implicit (the RHS depends on t) expression for the optimal income tax rate:
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(the upper bar indicates a simple arithmetic average and n is the Lagrangian 
multiplier of the budget constraint). Looking on the RHS, the first term reflects the 
usual tradeoff between equity (the numerator) and efficiency (the denominator) of the 
optimal taxation when tax evasion is not an option. The second term is a correction 
factor for tax evasion, and it cannot be signed. Even assuming the substitution effect 
(<5E/<5t | x^p) positive (i.e. the incentive effect is assumed positive), this is not enough 
to have the second term positive and therefore to claim that tax evasion calls for 
lower marginal rates. This could be true only if the evaders had also a regular 
income above the average and again it would be an efficiency argument. Anyway, 
the correction term is weighted by the quota of evaders into the economy, therefore 
if their number is negligible the optimal marginal income tax rate is not affected and 
the control of tax evasion is left to the use of $ and p.
The second question is simpler: what the rational taxpayer is interested in is the 
factor penalty (0) times the probability of paying the penalty (p). Therefore a trade­
off between 0 and p arises. As argued by Kolm if detection is costly and penalty is 
not, for the State the optimal choice is therefore "to hang the evaders with probability 
close to zero" and this applies to risk neutral as well as to risk averse individuals.
These results are found under two strong ethical assumptions: utilitarianism of the 
social welfare function and rational behaviour of individual. These assumptions 
regarded as standard while dealing with normal goods and activities should be deeply 
questioned when we are dealing with illegal activities.
When tax evasion is considered the final result is not robust to the choice of the 
SWF. The Utilitarian Social Welfare function for example, if no incentive effect is 
considered, allows for a decentralized self-redistribution such that tax evasion 
increases the SWF if evaders have higher than average marginal utilities of income 
(i.e . if they are the less well off). If there exists any incentive effect from the tax 
reduction (i.e. tax evasion) it could also be the case that the SWF increases if 
"skilled" people were allowed to evade. Allowing for efficiency arguments to play 
a role in the shape of optimal taxation seems to open the door to accepting horizontal 
inequality between evaders of similar income but with a different degree of tax 
compliance. As argued above, in order not to allow efficiency to play a role one 
needs to reshape the notion of rationality.
3. Indirect Tax Evasion
This section is constructed as the previous one. We will present two papers dealing 
with indirect tax evasion having two different approaches. Marrelli (1984), the first 
paper in the literature of indirect tax evasion, has the taxpayer’s perspective 
approach, similarly to Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Cremer and Gahvari (1993), 
has the social perspective approach, similarly to Sandmo (1981), and analyses how
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the presence of tax evasion modifies the Ramsey equation for the optimal commodity 
taxation.
3.1 The Taxpayer's Perspective Approach and Indirect Tax Evasion 
The monopolistic firm in the Marrelli’s model has revenues R(q) and an indirect tax 
tR(q) is imposed. The firm faces three choices: 1) to partially shift the tax onto 
consumers thus reducing production, increasing prices and reducing profits 2 ) to try 
to evade the tax by declaring a fraction a of total revenue R(q); 3) any combination 
of 1) and 2 ).
The net income of the under reporting firm will depend again on the event for the
firm of not being caught (income Y) or of being caught (income Z). Therefore the
the owner of the firm will maximize his expected utility:
. Y = ( l - t a ) R ( q )  - C { q )  (20)
Z = ( l - t a ) R ( q )  - C ( q )  - 0 t ( l - a ) R { q )  (21)
Therefore the owner of the firm chooses a and q to maximise an expected utility 
function subject to a constraint on production and a constraint on evasion:
Max E { U ) = ( l - p ) U { Y ) + p U { z )  (22)
a ,  q
s .  t :  qzO (23)
O s a s l  (24)
Now, two different cases have to be analyzed:
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Case 1: p. the probability of being caught, is assumed to be exogenous. Solving the 
Kuhn Tucker conditions one finds that the firm will choose its equilibrium quantity 
in between the two quantities such that:
R ' i i l - a t )  - 0 f c ( 1 - a ) ] =C/ (25)
a n d
R1 ( 1 - a  t )  -C'  (26)
where for the equilibrium quantity the following holds:
^ [ ( 1 - a t )  - 0 1 (1 -a )  ] ^ C ^ f l ' U - a t )  (27)
which has an easy interpretation: given the optimal quantity to produce if the firm is 
evading and is caught evading, the marginal revenue will be less than the marginal 
cost; if the firm is evading, but it is not caught evading, the marginal revenue will 
be greater than the marginal cost. If the monopolist reports everything (a = l) , case 
of no evasion, we are back to the standard monopolistic behaviour where marginal 
revenue is equal to the marginal cost; with a = l  the inequality above holds with 
equality.
Moreover solving the Kuhn Tucker conditions one finds that, in case of q> 0 , p0> 1 
is a sufficient condition for the case of no evasion (a = l) . Notice that p 0 > l is 
generally implied by p0> t found by Allingham and Sandmo. It can be also shown 
that in case of 0 < a <  1 it may exists an equilibrium quantity (q) such that:
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( l - t ) i ? / ( g ) - C / ( g ) = 0  ( 28 )
so the monopolist may be able to shift the tax onto consumers just as he would if he 
were not evading taxes. Or in other words the after tax marginal conditions for profit 
maximisation are the same as those occurring in the absence of any tax evasion. The 
shifting and the evading problems, in this case, are separable. Finally a bit of 
comparative analysis permits to sign the following:
d a / d q > 0 ;  (2 9 )
d a / d Q > 0 ;  (3 0 )
d a / d t  ? (3 1 )
Eq. 29 supports the common belief that big firms evade proportionally less than small 
firms (provided they act as monopolist). Eq. 30 is simply tied to the rationality of the 
monopolist. Eq. 31 is the same ambiguous result obtained by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972).
Case 2: p depends on the amount of gross revenues the taxpayer reports. This idea 
was present in Allingham and Sandmo (1972), but they just showed that some 
comparative static results, obtained under the hypothesis of p exogenous, carry over 
also with p endogenous. Nevertheless they stated that ”a natural hypothesis on the 
sign of the dependence [between p and atR] does not immediately suggest itself,
[ but] within our framework of individual choice p’(atR)<0 seems the more
natural hypothesis.”
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Anyway given, p=p(atR), we will analyze:
p’ >  0  case 2 a
p ’ < 0  case 2 b
The analyses is done as in the previous case solving the Kuhn Tucker conditions and 
focusing on an interior solution for a.
Case 2a: if p’> 0  we obtain R’(l-t)-C’ > 0  so the equilibrium quantity the firm 
produces will be smaller than the one it would produce if it did not evade (or than 
that of Case 1).
Case 2b: if p’< 0  we obtain R*(l-t)-C’< 0  so the equilibrium quantity the firm 
produces will be greater than the one it would produce if it did not evade (or than 
that of Case 1).
In both cases the separability result between production and evasion decisions 
vanishes. If p* < 0  the firm will both produce more than in the non evasion case and 
will produce and declare more than in the fixed probability case. Thus p ’ < 0 may be 
said an efficient rule. This result strongly supports the common belief that there are 
more evaders among small firms than among big firms. An efficient monitoring 
policy should focus on small firms because it gives as by-product a stimulus for firms 
to produce and declare more. This may also be connected with the first result we had 
from Allingham and Sandmo stating that a small firm is more likely to evade than a 
big firm.
The last part of the Marrelli (1984) gives a rigorous justification to a common belief 
which is quite often taken for granted in the literature, (see e.g. Boadway, Marchand
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and Pestieau (1992)): direct taxes are more likely to be evaded than indirect taxes. 
Actually Marrelli shows that, in presence of absolute decreasing risk aversion, if 
direct and indirect taxes yield a priori the same total tax receipts, the optimal interior 
rate of indirect tax declaration will be greater than the corresponding direct tax one. 
Marrelli (1984) considers a very particular problem (the optimal tax declaration for 
a price maker), but it has the merit to have initiated the literature of indirect tax 
evasion and to have proved some general results.
3.2 The Social Perspective Approach and Indirect Tax Evasion 
Although papers are very rare in this area we are lucky enough to have an article by 
Cremer and Gahvari appeared in the February 1993 issue of the Journal of Public 
Economics. This is not only one of the most recent papers focusing on this issue, but 
also the first (to my knowledge) so complete and self-contained.
The paper considers a competitive economy consisting of n industries producing n 
different commodities and a Government levying ad valorem taxes tR. Differently 
from other papers evasion is not free, but there is a per unit cost of concealing 
resources given by the function 7 =yj(l-a), where 7 ’ > 0 .
The tax administration audits and discovers as cheating a fraction p of firms. The 
firms that are caught cheating are taxed on the true amount of their sales and, in 
addition, have to pay a fine proportional to the amount of tax evaded. A competitive 
firm in the industry i maximises its expected profits:
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Max  7ii = g * { P r - c -  ( 1 - a )  * y± ( 1 - a )  -  [ ( 1 - p )  a t + p (  fc+0 ( 1 - a )  t)  ])  (32)  
a , q
(where i refers to the industry and Pq stands for the consumer price of the good 
produced in the industry i). Note that the optimal choice of a , means the 
minimisation of the "fiscal costs" and so leads to minimise:
f =  ( 1 - a )  *yi ( 1 - a )  + [ ( 1 - p )  a t  +p( t+0 ( 1 - a )  t ]  (33)  
w h i c h ,  d e f i n i n g
g= ( 1 - a )  y i ( 1 - a )  a n d  t e= [ ( 1 - p )  a t+ p (  t+0 ( 1 - a )  t]  ,
can  b e  r e w r i t t e n  a s
f = g + t e
the choice of a  is clearly independent of q. This separability between output and 
evasion decisions arises because the evasion cost has been assumed proportional to 
output. Under this (restrictive) assumption, the Marrelli (1984) result of separability 
between production and evasion extends therefore to the case of competitive markets, 
too. The competitive market equilibrium (obtained taking the first order condition 
with respect to q) requires that:
P r = c + f  (34)
which is the analogue to the familiar condition for the competitive markets "price = 
marginal costs" once "fiscal costs" have been taken into account. The gross tax 
revenues are:
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^ t 0q i ( p 1. . . p n) (35)  
w h e r e :
t  e= (1 -p )  a t + p  ( t+0 (1 - a ) t ) , 
i s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  t a x  r a t e
and they serve to finance G, public expenditures, and d(p), the auditing costs. From 
the tax collector’s point of view t,p and 0 are policy instruments. The instruments at 
his disposal are therefore three instead than one as usual. A comparative analysis 
helps to better understand the optimal policy results. As far as the effects of dt are 
concerned we obtain:
d a / d t < 0  (36)
d P r / d t >0 (37)
d G / d t  ? (38)
The first two are readily interpretable. (Note that the hypothesis of no free evasion 
permitted to sign the first one that had an indeterminate sign both in Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and in Marrelli (1984)). The third points out the possibility that in 
presence of tax evasion an increasing in tax rate may lead to a decrease in total tax 
revenues due to the possible reduction of the tax base as indicated by the first one. 
As far as the effects of dp are concerned we obtain:
d a / d p > 0  (39)
d P r / d p  >0 (40)
d G / d p ? (41)
The first two are quite intuitive and the first has been already proved by Allingham
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and Sandmo (1972). The third one that normally is positive, states the possibility of 
a perverse effect: the increase in the probability of being caught, decreases the 
evasion so that the reduction in the revenues from the penalty completely offsets the 
increase in tax payments.
The Central Planner’s problem, which is also the tax collector’s problem, is to 
maximise the Social Welfare Function given the budget constraint:
S £ = V ( P r )  +X t , t f q i - d { u )  ~G ( 4 2 )
(Where Pr is the vector of consumer prices and p the vector of audit probabilities in 
the n industries). Note that in the argument Pr of the indirect utility function, also the 
consumer’s decision about a enters via g and te (Eq. (33) and Eq. (34)). The penalty 
rate 6 enters as well in the calculation of f .
Cremer and Gahvari arrive to two main results: 1) the establishment of the 
fundamental relationship between the vector of tax rates and the vector of audit 
probabilities. 2) the derivation of a modified "Ramsey rule" allowing for evasion.
1. Taking the first order condition and equalising them to zero one gets the result 
explaining the fundamental relationship between an optimal commodity tax on good 
k and the audit probability for firms in the industry producing k:
d P i J d t k _ d t £ / d t k (4;j)
dPrk/ d p k d t Z / d p k- d k/ q k
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which has the following appealing interpretation. The LHS is the rate of substitution 
between t*. and p* such that Prk and therefore the consumer’s welfare remains 
constant. The RHS is the rate of substitution between ^  and pk such that the 
government tax revenues (net of audit costs) remain constant. At optimum these two 
rates of substitution must be equal.
2. Using the Slutzky decomposition into the first order conditions they arrive to the 
following (for all k= l..i..n ):
E t i d <3k I _ _0P r, lc/ dM
n 0 tj
= d P r J d t t Qk (
The standard Ramsey rule is a special case of Eq. (44) and is obtained when the 
second term on the RHS is equal to q^ . (i.e. the ratio is equal to one) and tei= ti. The 
second term represents the distortion created by the tax evasion: the higher (closer 
to one) the ratio is, the smaller the distortion (from Eq 34 is clear that a difference 
between 3te and 3Pr is given by g, which, from a welfare point of view, is a loss of 
resources). Therefore this term calls for a greater proportionate reduction in 
compensated demand the smaller is the distortion created by tax evasion. In presence 
of tax evasion the traditional interpretation that "the optimal tax structure involves an 
equal proportionate movement along the compensated demand curve for all goods" 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) is no longer valid.
From this modified Ramsey rule three specific results are found.
1) In absence of cross-price effects, two goods having the same elasticity to their
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prices need to be taxed differently if the evasion in the two markets is different. 
Namely the expected tax rate in the market subject to more tax evasion will be less 
than in the market with less tax evasion. But the optimal legislated tax rate (assuming 
equal costs and prices in both markets) will be higher on the good where tax evasion 
is higher.
2) In presence of tax evasion, exogenous income does not imply that uniform taxation 
of all goods is optimal. This result has a clear interpretation: if tax evasion is an 
option "reported" income is no longer exogenous even if the income itself is 
exogenous.
3) Wage and uniform commodity taxation are no longer equivalent (somewhat 
obvious given the second result).
4. Concluding Remarks
The aim of this survey was to assess the state of the art in the indirect tax evasion 
literature, which consists of ten papers at most, and to compare it to the direct tax 
evasion literature which counts a few hundred papers and books. We showed that the 
two main approaches adopted in the direct tax evasion literature are adopted in the 
indirect tax evasion literature as well. We think that the development and the present 
state of the art of both literatures is so similar that they share the same strengths and 
the same weaknesses. Four main points are worth to be underlined:
1) Both literatures arrive at an optimal taxation result when the case of tax evasion 
is taken into account. Both literatures arrive also at the result, quite intuitive, that
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those who declare less are more likely to have evaded a larger amount of taxes than 
those who declare more. Could be interesting to refine this result assuming many 
types of individuals under Government imperfect information.
2) Evasion is better fought using all three instruments: t, p, 6. There is a trade off 
between p and 9 and it is possible to determine a kind of marginal rule for p and t. 
Generally speaking, if evasion is not so widespread p and 6 are enough: when evasion 
becomes a mass phenomenon a suitable t has to be chosen, too. However there does 
not seem to be evidence that evasion should necessarily call for lower tax rates.
3) Both literatures are quite unknown. Nevertheless evasion is a present problem and 
"for the immediate future, at least, [...] is here to stay” (Cowell 1990): we do think 
that the results already obtained should be better known and more efforts should be 
invested in discovering new ones.
4) Many and deeper thoughts are necessary about the economic treatment of illegal 
activities: we should wonder if efficiency arguments are enough to allow a (partial) 
accommodation of illegal activities as tax evasion. If this is case, it means that we are 
ready to accept that two agents with similar earned income have different level of 
welfare depending on their degree of tax compliance. In presence of tax evasion, 
when the competitive equilibrium is reached as a decentralized solution, evaders may 
be better off than honest citizens. This seems at odds with the widely accepted notion 
of horizontal equity. With the partial exception of Cowell (1990) the literature on tax 
evasion has never dealt with this aspect.
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Legend
E(U)= Expected Utility Function 
U =  Utility Function.
W = Actual income.
R= Revenues from sale:
=R(q)= in monopolistic case,
= p r * q =  in perfect competition case, 
where:
Pr=price per unit, 
q=quantity: number of units.
R’(q)= marginal revenue.
C (q)= cost function.
C ,( q ) = c =  marginal cost.
G= government expenditures.
L =  labour supply in regular market.
E= labour supply in irregular market.
X= post tax income (i.e. consumption) in case of non evasion.
Y = post tax income (i.e. consumption) in case of evasion and no detection.
Z =  post tax income (i.e. consumption) in case of evasion and detection.
n=  index for non evader taxpayers.
e=  index for evader taxpayers.
a — proportion of declared income on total income.
7 = cost function of concealing income. 
t=  marginal tax rate.
T =  lump sum element of the income tax schedule (subsidy if T > 0 , tax if T <0). 
te= expected tax rate.
6— penalty rate.
p=  probability of being caught.
d(g)= costs of auditing.
f=  fiscal costs
g=  costs of evading taxes.
So ,=  reputation in state 0 , 1 .
4>= net social marginal utility of income.
ARAX= absolute risk aversion at income X.
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Chapter 3
TAX STRUCTURE, TAX REFORM AND TAX EVASION*
Mario Nava 
Center fo r Economic Performance 
London School o f Economics,
Abstract
In this paper we explore whether the shift from an ad valorem tax to a value added tax (which 
is a prerequisite to join the European Union) improves the "integrity" (number of people in the 
regular market) and the "efficiency" (total tax revenues) of the tax system. A model of two 
parallel (black and regular) markets is analyzed. The production in both the black and the 
regular market is divided in three stages: raw material, intermediate good and final good. 
Firstly, we prove that if an ad valorem tax is levied, at all stages of the regular market, any, 
even partial, tax reform towards VAT unequivocally increases integrity (the number of agents). 
Secondly, we prove that efficiency of the tax system is a direct function of its integrity. 
Therefore a tax reform from ad valorem to VAT seems justifiable under these two criteria. As 
a passing result, regular market consumers* welfare is shown to increase.
* Thanks are due to Kevin Roberts for invaluable assistance and to all participants to the 
1994 London Jamboree, of the European Doctoral Program in Quantitative Economics for their 
comments. Excellent written and oral comments by Mick Keen and Tim Besley have been of 
great assistance in shaping the final version. The usual disclaimers apply.
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1. Introduction
The literature on Tax Evasion is 22 years old and contains roughly 210 papers. About 200 of 
them focuses on direct tax evasion, the rest on indirect tax evasion1. The approach of the vast 
majority of papers may be divided in two broad types: the taxpayer’s point of view and the tax 
collector’s point of view. The first approach explores the taxpayer’s choice under the uncertainty 
on whether or not to report the complete tax base. Usually the aim is to determine, under 
reasonable conditions, the optimal fraction of tax base to report. The second approach examines 
the choices of the tax collector who has to set the optimal tax rate knowing that evasion is a 
possible option for agents. The best papers following this second approach offer as their main 
contribution a modified Mirrlees-Stiglitz result for direct taxation and a modified Ramsey rule 
for indirect taxation. The modifications are due to fact that face to tax evasion the State also has 
some additional instruments to fight it: usually a penalty rate and a probability to catch evaders. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter if detection is costly and penalty is not, for the State the 
optimal choice is therefore to "hang the evaders with probability close to zero" and this applies 
to risk neutral as well as to risk averse individuals. If anything (e.g. moral considerations) 
reduces the maximum penalty to less than "hanging" and political argument forces for a 
minimum detection activity, the solution is again likely to be a comer solution with the 
maximum possible penalty and the minimum possible detection activity.
As far as the taxpayer’s point of view is concerned, I have borrowed Kolm’s word (1973): "This 
is hardly Public Economics; in fact it is very private. What is Public Economics is the tax
1 For a recent survey of tax evasion literature from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) seminal 
paper, to Cremer and Gahvary (1993), see the previous chapter of this thesis.
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collectors point of view". Indeed, the taxpayer’s point of view is basically an exercise of 
maximization under uncertainty. The tax collector’s point of view, being a derivation of the 
Mirrlees approach, is embedded into Public Economics literature and it is regarded as the main 
theoretical answer to the tax evasion question.
However, the core characteristic of both approaches is similar: given a certain tax structure they 
seek to maximize a Utility Function and a Social Welfare Function, respectively.
Differently from this, the present paper focuses on a comparison between two tax structures: an 
"ad valorem tax" and a "value added tax" (respectively AVT and VAT henceforth). The point 
we want to address is the following: if economic agents (profit maximizing firms and utility 
maximizing consumers) had the choice, subject to certain conditions, between a regular and a 
black market, how would their choices be affected by the tax system? In other words, which of 
the two tax structure attracts more agents into the regular market? Which effect does this have 
on the total tax revenues? Which effect does it have on prices and quantities produced in the 
regular market?
For the purpose of this paper we shall define the integrity of a tax system as a direct function 
of the number of people in the regular market and the efficiency of the tax system as a direct 
function of total tax revenue. We will show how integrity and efficiency are affected by a 
change from AVT to VAT.
The motivation for this paper comes from the fact that having a VAT system is a requirement 
imposed to candidate members of European Union. In the economic literature and among 
practitioners this requirement is justified on the production efficiency ground: VAT is superior 
to AVT since it does not interfere with the production decisions and allows inputs to enter the
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production function free of taxes. In this paper we wish to evaluate, not in terms of production 
efficiency, but in terms of integrity and efficiency of the tax system as defined above, the effects 
of a shift from AVT to VAT. It will be shown that such a move unequivocally increases 
integrity and that efficiency is a direct function of integrity. This provides a justification to this 
requirement on a ground quite different from the standard production neutrality one. As a 
passing result we will show that the ever-honest consumers* surplus increases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 compares the core characteristics of an AVT and 
a VAT systems. Section 3 and 4 introduce the model under AVT and VAT, respectively. Section
4.1 and 4.2 analyze the effects in terms of integrity and efficiency of a VAT to the first stage 
of production and to all stages of production, respectively and section 4.3 compares the results 
of the two previous sections. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model Characteristics: AVT vs VAT.
To address our point about tax evasion, we assume that there are two parallel markets: the 
regular one and the black one. The Government is able to levy taxes only in the regular market. 
Each firm can choose in which market to operate and does so following a profit maximizing 
criterion. In both markets, the good on sale is the same, but in the regular market consumers 
are entitled to post-sale assistance while in the black market the seller disappears immediately 
after the sale. Therefore prices in the black market are systematically lower than in the regular 
market.
The production in both markets is divided in 3 stages: raw material firms, intermediate good
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firms and final good firms. There is different type of firm for each stage of production. Since 
we are not interested in showing how intra-firm decisions are affected by fiscal changes all firms 
have the same production function which is a 1 to 1 production function: (i.e. each intermediate 
good firm buys one unit of input (raw material) from a raw material firm to produce and sell 
one unit of output (intermediate good) to a final good firm which uses it as an input). This 
assumption amounts to the imposition of two restrictions to the model. Firstly, there is only one 
kind of input: this is a strong assumption and makes analyzing tax effects on input substitution 
(e.g. of labour with other factors of production) impossible. Secondly, each firm can only 
choose to produce zero or one. The first restriction is so important that it can only be overcome 
by writing another paper. We are indeed thinking of this issue as the main extension to this 
paper. The second problem can be solved easily in this paper by focusing on the aggregate 
market production level instead of the firm production level.
We want to show to what extent the movement of firms from the black to the regular market is 
affected by a shift from AVT to VAT.
The VAT model we are thinking of is the one currently used by each country of the European 
Union for domestic transaction: the so-called origin system2. The crucial characteristic of a 
VAT origin system is that though taxes are neutral with respect to the production Junction,
2 For intra-community trade the system now in place (transitory regime) is an hybrid of 
origin and destination regime. The Council has urged the Commission to submit a proposition 
for a definitive regime which should extend the origin system valid for domestic transactions to 
intra-community ones. At the Verona Ecofin meeting (April 1996) it has been announced that 
"The Commission will present before the summer its strategic program for a definitive VAT 
system based in the Member States of origin".
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goods circulate tax paid. This is made possible by a system of payment and reimbursement (i.e. 
a system of credits and debts with the Tax Authorities) which greatly reduces possibilities of 
fraud. Each time the good, from raw material to final product, is sold there is a possibility of 
control by the Tax Authorities. Goods are sort of earmarked during their evolution "from the 
mine to the shop" and it is easy for the Tax Authorities to detect if goods disappear at some 
intermediate stage. This means that the VAT system is a sort of "trap": if a good belongs to the 
regular market at stage s, it has to belong to the regular market also at stage (s-1) and (s+ 1) and 
therefore at all stages from 1 to S, since any intermediate agent would find hard to explain to 
the Tax Authorities why having bought a certain quantity of inputs a lower quantity of output 
is sold (and/or viceversa). We may therefore claim, without loss of generality, that each firm 
has the same type of input and output market.
The AVT model we are thinking of is the most standard one, where a tax t is levied, from the 
buyer, at each stage of production. This tax structure, differently from the VAT one, does not 
have a built-in possibility of cross-checking. However, in the "real world" when an AVT regime 
is in place it may be advantageous to buy in the black market (prices are lower) and to sell in 
the regular market (prices are higher), while viceversa is generally unprofitable. In other words 
if the inputs are both in the black market, the output might be sold both in the regular and in 
the black market; viceversa if the inputs are bought in the regular market the output as well is 
likely to be sold in the regular market. This means that under the AVT regime the "trap" effect 
only works going downward in the production chain and it is given by profit maximizing 
behaviour of the economic agents and not by a built in characteristic of the tax structure. If a 
good belongs to the regular market at stage s it will probably belong to the regular market at
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stage S, but nothing can be said for the stages 1 to (s-1).
3. A Model for AVT
A standard AVT is perceived at each stage of production. The economy is a three-stage, two- 
market one and it can therefore be described by three couples of demand-supply equations (Eq. 
1 to 6 ), for the three different stages of production and 3 equilibrium conditions (Eq. 9 to 11) 
between the black and the regular market at each stage of production. Following through from 
our initial assumption that each firm buys one unit of input and produces one unit of output the 
quantity sold in both parallel markets, is equal to the number of firms. We will therefore express 
all demand and supply relationships as price vs number of firms:
Raw Material Market
(1)
Demand: >^4r( l +0 =ar~P^i4r
Supply: PAr=tr+S/iAr (2)
Intermediate Good Market
(3)
Demand: PAi(l +f)=CL.-$nAi
Supply: PArYj+S,nM (4)
Final Good Market
(5)
Demand: PAJ( l +t)=af - pf iAf
Supply: PA/-'<f*^/lAf  «*)
Where P stands for Price and n for number of firms (subscript A stands for AVT, r for raw
material, i for intermediate good and f for final good). All parameters are assumed positive.
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Each of the three couples determines simultaneously a unique equilibrium in terms of price and 
number of agents. The raw material market is cleared by the couple PAr and nAr. The buyer-firm 
pays PAr(l+ t)  and the seller-firm cashes Pad the state gets nArtPAr. The same in the other two 
markets. Given that no restrictions are imposed on the parameters across the three stages of 
production, nAr, nAi and nAf are equal only by accident (if all parameters are equal at the three 
stages of production) and the same is true for Pad PAi and Pat- Indeed:
nArti f
Using Eq. 1 and 2, nAr (e.g.) can be written more conveniently as:
(8)
Ar
M 8 ,  Pr+ 8 r
Had taxes not existed all agents would belong to the regular market, and, e.g. for the raw 
material market the equilibrium number of firms would be n T= (aT- y r) /  (Pr +5r ) , and hence 
nAr< n r follows immediately from Eq. 8 .
Under AVT, firms can buy their input in the black market and sell in the black or in the regular 
market, final consumers will pay PAf> and the profits of each firm will be equal to the difference 
between the selling and the buying price, t is assumed to be set optimally (i.e. to maximize tax 
revenue) by the Government and the total tax revenue will be nArtPAr+nAitPAi+ nAftPAf.
A similar structure is observed in the black market where the Government is of course unable 
to levy taxes. There are (N-nAr) firms producing and selling raw material at price pr. (N-nAi)
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intermediate firms transform the raw material into one unit of intermediate good to be sold it 
in the regular market at price p{. (N-nAf) final good firms buy a unit of intermediate good and 
transform it into a unit of the final good to be sold at price pf to (N-nj) black market consumers. 
In the black market the state raises no revenue, raw material firms make a profit pf pr, 
intermediate good firms make a profit of prpr and final good firms make a profit of pr pj. Table 
1 summarizes:
TABLE 1: AD VALOREM TAX
Raw mat.
firms
profits
Intermed 
firm profits
Final
firm
Profits
State
tax
revenue
Total
consum.
expen.
Reg. market: 
nj agents
PAr PrPAr(l+t) PArP Ai(l+ 0 nArtPAr+
nAitPAi+
nAftPAf*
nAfPAf
Black market: 
(N-n,) agents
Pr PfPr PrPi zero (N-nAf)pf
Each firm is free to decide in which market to operate and will do so in the market where profits 
are higher. It amounts to saying that if we observe nA firms in the regular market and (N-n^ 
firms in the black market, at a given stage of production, these conditions hold:
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P*rP, »
PA rPAr(-l+t) =PrPr <10>
PA f PA ^ > P f P i  (11)
A price change affects the number of agents in each market and therefore it affects the total state
tax revenue. We do not assume entry-exit barriers so we will observe a swing of firms and
consumers between markets which would depend on the prices in each of them. Equilibrium is
obtained when conditions 9, 10 and 11 hold.
4. From AVT to VAT system
In this section we present the main idea of the paper. We will show first that a change in the tax 
structure from AVT to VAT increases the number of agents in the regular market (the integrity 
of the tax system) and second, that total tax revenues (the efficiency of the tax system) is a direct 
function of the increase in integrity. The point we will make is that the shift from AVT to VAT 
encourages firms and consumers to move away from the black market towards the regular 
market. Moreover, competition is increased and prices are reduced. We will claim that a VAT 
system broadens the regular markets and more consumers are attracted even if they do not have 
a direct fiscal incentive.
The first important difference between VAT and AVT is that the former gives a fiscal rebate for 
the inputs bought in upstream markets, while the latter does not. The second important 
difference is that, as argued before, under VAT each firm has the same type of input and output 
market.
Introducing in the model a tax rebate equal to r, for the buying firms, it allows to span all
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combinations from AVT to VAT. When 7=0 in all markets we have an AVT system, when 7 = t 
in all markets, but the final one, we end up with a complete VAT system.
4.1 VAT only in the raw Material Market.
To describe the new equilibrium under the VAT scheme we start with the hypothesis that a 
subsidy 7  (0<zz t )  is granted only in the raw material market. It amounts to saying that we 
have a VAT system in the first market and an AVT in the other markets. We want to find out 
the consequences in terms of integrity and efficiency in all markets, of changing the fiscal 
system in the most upstream market. In order to respect our assumption of equal number of 
firms at each stage of production we define the equilibrium for the raw material market, the 
intermediate good market and the final good market in three steps.
I Step: The market equilibrium for the raw material market is described by the following couple: 
Demand: PvJ(\+t-T:)=(tr- § rn Vr (12)
Supply: Pvr Y r*t>Pvr (13)
(Where V stands for VAT). Solving this system simultaneously one finds (nVr, PVr) where:
( i4 )
F'  Pr+8r( l +i - t )  pr+6,
Notice that nVr will also be the number of firms at the intermediate stage of production (by virtue 
of VAT) and in the final market as well (by virtue of AVT as mentioned in the last paragraph 
of Section 2). It can therefore be called simply nv.
II Step: The market equilibrium for the intermediate good market is defined as follows. Since
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nv is given by the equilibrium in the raw material market (as described in the I step) and since
t is assumed equal in all markets, suppliers need to offer at the price Pvi such that the point
(Pvi(l+ t), nv) is on the demand curve of the intermediate market:
Demand: P w(l+t)=a|.-p iwK (15)
The price Pvi is found on the demand curve in order to ensure that all the nv firms which have 
bought inputs in the raw material market find a buyer when selling their output in the 
intermediate market. On the supply side, since nv is given from step I and PV; is determined 
from Eq. (15), in order to satisfy the supply curve equation and to avoid over-determination, we 
need to allow for the supply to expand:
Supply: ^
The expansion of the supply is accounted for by the term 6 vi. This means that the endogenous 
variables of the intermediate good market are therefore Pvi and 5vi since the number of people 
nv is given by the solution of the raw material market. Therefore 5vj depends on PVr and nv 
determined in the first market and it changes according to the equilibrium solution in the first 
market3.
Notice that 5 would normally be thought of as given by the technology. To obtain market 
clearing through it, would mean to assume that technological changes do follow changes in
3 To obtain the exact parametrization of the dependence between <5vi and nv one could rewrite 
Eq. (16) as follows: h vi= { P vi - y ±) / n v and substitute Pvi using Eq. (15) thus obtaining
6 vi=( / n v which shows the (inverse) relationship between 5vi and nv.
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prices (provoked by changes in taxation). Conceptually this would seem somewhat odd, thought 
not inadmissible.
However, the 5 of our model is not a technological parameter: the equations where it appears, 
including those it clears, do not show the total production of a given good, but only the amount 
o f production o f a given good which is offered in the regular market (the total production being 
the sum of what is sold in the regular and in the black market). For example Eq. 13, 16 and 20 
represent the supply of the regular market which is not the total supply, given that, there is a 
non-zero supply for the black market (as it is hinted by equations 9 to 11). 5 is therefore a 
"strategic" parameter which determines only the division of the total production between black 
and regular market and it can thus change when market conditions (e.g. taxation) change in any 
of the two markets.
This step by step solution of the model allows the price of the raw material to enter the supply 
curve of the intermediate sector (through nv) and accounts for the expansion of the supply via 
the increase in the value of 6 . The increased number of agents in the regular market and the 
expansion of the supply make Pvi lower than PAi. Indeed subtracting Eq 15 from Eq 3 and 
making use of Eq.14, one obtains:
III Step: Given nv, the equilibrium in the final good market is determined in the same way as
(17)
or simply using Eq. 14 rearranged:
(1+tXPAi-p v )=Vi(nrrnA) (18)
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in the intermediate market. The endogenous variables are still the price and the slope of the 
supply function (PVf and 5Vt) given that the number of agents in the system is already 
determined. This implies that, given the tax rate t to fully satisfy the demand at the quantity nv:
Demand'. Pvp .H )-a f -P p v (19)
the supply has to expand in order to offer nv at the price Pvf:
Supply: Pvf=yf +bvjnv
Being nv> nA in any market and Pvi,f< P Ai, f in the intermediate and in the final market we have 
by necessity 5vi<5Ai and dvf<dAf (i.e. the supply expands for positive values of r).
This closes the system of 6  equations (Eq. (12) and (13; Eq. (15) and (16); Eq. (19) and (20)) 
in 6  unknowns (PVr, nVr; Pvi, 8wi; Pvf, 6 vf) which describes the equilibrium in the regular market 
under VAT. Annex 1 gives a textual and diagrammatical explanation of the three steps.
Two conclusions may be drawn from this exercise: the subsidy has a direct effect on the demand 
side which provokes an increase in the number of people willing to buy raw material in the 
regular market. Since each agent has the same type of market for inputs and outputs, there is 
also an increase in the number of agents offering goods in the intermediate good market which 
leads to an expansion of the supply (i.e. the supply curve turns clockwise).
The price in the intermediate market is given by Eq. 18 which has a standard interpretation. It 
says that the price decrease is equal to the increase in the quantity demanded multiplied by the 
elasticity of the demand curve. A similar equation to Eq.18 can be written for the price in the
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final good market. A subsidy on the demand side of the most upstream market permanently 
increases the number of agents in that market by the fixed amount TpyJ((3r+5r). The new 
number of agents will be the same in all the following markets and this permanently reduces the 
price in those markets. From the ever-honest consumers’ point of view this is a net improvement 
(more good are available at a lower price). Table 2 summarizes the situation:
TABLE 2: VAT ONLY IN THE RAW MATERIAL MARKET.
Rawmat
firms
prof.
Intermed 
firm profits
Final
firm
Prof.
State
tax
revenue
Cons
expen
Reg. market: 
n2 agents
P Vr PyfP vr(H"!_r) Pvr-
P V i(l+t-r)
nv(t-r)PVr
+nvtPvi
+nvtPvf
nvpf(l+t)
Black market: 
(N-n2) agents
Pvr PvrPvr PvrPvi zero (N-nv)pvf
Proposition 1: a change from AVT to VAT only in the most upstream market increases the 
number of agents in the regular market thus increasing the integrity of the system. This 
reduces prices in all downstream markets. Notice that the larger r  is, the greater the effect 
on integrity is and therefore the greater the reduction of prices is.
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The net effect on the State Budget will depend on the number of new customers attracted into
the regular market and the amount of taxation lost and gained at each stage. The shift from AVT 
to VAT will not worsen the Government Budget if the additional taxes paid by the new people 
attracted into the regular market are higher than the rebate conceded. The condition to assert that 
a VAT only in the raw material market does not worsen the Government Budget is therefore as 
follows:
A sufficient condition would be realized if all the three brackets on the LHS of Eq. 21 were
The same can be shown for the third bracket.
Unfortunately operating the same substitutions for the first bracket (using Eq. 14, 1 and 12) a 
more complicated expression is obtained, the sign of which is ambiguous:
Where 0 t=  ( t - x )  / 1 . Nevertheless, using Eq. 24 and 23 and Eq.14, the necessary condition
(rty(t x)PVr n^tPJ+iriytPyi nA ^ A )+^ nv(^vf a) ^ (21)
proved to be positive. The second and the third brackets can easily shown to be positive. Indeed
the second bracket can be rewritten, using Eq. 14 and Eq.3 and Eq. 15 as:
(22)
which, after opportune simplifications, reduces to:
(23)
(24)
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for Eq.21 to be positive can be written as: 
(nK-ni4P[(or+Pr(nK-nA))e/+(«,+P,.(«K-nj4^
(25)
Eq. 25 is more likely to be verified the larger the difference between nv and nA at each stage of 
production is. Therefore:
Proposition 2: When VAT is introduced in the most upstream market, integrity and 
efficiency of the tax system are positively correlated.
4.2 Multi-stage VAT.
In this section we remove the hypothesis that a rebate r  is introduced only in the first market and 
we assume that it is introduced simultaneously in all markets, except of course the final one. 
This depicts a system where a VAT is levied at all stages of production. We retain however the 
general formulation of VAT as a rebate t  on the gross selling price which allows to span 
all the way from AVT (r=0) to full VAT (r=t). The introduction of the rebate r  in both raw 
material and intermediate market modifies the system as follows:
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Raw Material Market
(26)
Demand:
Supply. Pm  = y + l / i mr (27)
Intermediate Good Market
(28)
Demand: Pmi( \* t - t> a r ^ f lmi
Supply. P nrrft+ Spnn  . <2J>)
Final Good Market
(30)
Demand: PmP -+t)=a.f - $ p m f
Supply: P y u n ^ P m t  (31)
(Where VM means a multi-stage VAT and the other subscripts are as before). The solution to 
the whole system is found again in three steps:
I Step: a simultaneous solution to the raw material and the intermediate market is looked for. 
An equilibrium for nVMi and nVMr will be found. In general, nothing insures that nVMi=nVMr. 
However, given the "trap” characteristic of the VAT system discussed above the number of 
agents in each market has to be the same. Hence, n w= max {nI , n i , ) will be the total 
number of agents both in the raw material and in the intermediate market. Assume, e.g. and 
without loss of generality, that nVMn
(1+ ,_ T) ^
™' p,+8r(l+f-t) »  P,+8,
is the biggest number of agents across markets. For brevity, nVMr can henceforth be written nVM- 
This means that the raw material market solves simultaneously for (nVMr, PVMr)-
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II step and III step: the equilibrium in the other markets is found as in section 4.1. The number 
of agents is now given in all markets and is equal to nVM (by virtue of the VAT system), the 
price is read on the demand curve of each market, the tax is given at the rate (t-r) in the 
intermediate market and t in the final market and the system is solved allowing the supply to 
expand in both markets. Effects on prices are identical to section 4.1 and are regulated by the 
equivalent of Eq. 18:
03)
Proposition 3: For a given VAT rate, a VAT tax in all markets, but the last one, has 
integrity effect greater than or equal to a VAT only in the first market. This implies that 
also price reductions are greater than or equal to the case of VAT only in the first market.
Notice that the larger r  is, the greater the effect on integrity is and therefore the greater the 
reduction of prices is.
To check whether integrity and efficiency are still positively correlated we need to perform an 
analysis similar to section 4.1, since the net effect on the State Budget will again depend on the 
number of new customers attracted into the regular market and the amount of taxation lost and 
gained at each stage. Therefore the conditions to assert that the shift from AVT to VAT at all 
stages of production does not worsen the Government Budget is the following:
( j1 v i / t  ~ T ^ V M r ~nA r^A r) + (n  V fJ t ~ X^ V M i ~ nA ^ A ^  + ( n  VMf~n Af> ^
The sufficient condition would be realized if all the three brackets on the LHS of Eq. 34 were
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to be proved positive. The third brackets can easily be proved positive. Indeed (e.g.) the third 
bracket can be written, using Eq. 32, and Eq.3 and Eq. 28 as:
r P  \ /  
VMr
6 +6 Hr r j
ai $inAi Pi
T PVMr
6 +6 Hr i
- n J a r PpJ> 0 (35)
which, after opportune simplifications, reduces to:
T P VMr
P,+«,
(36)
Operating the same substitutions in the first and in the second bracket of Eq. 34 the following 
expression can be obtained, whose sign is ambiguous, e.g. for the first bracket:
VMr
6  + 6  \ r r
( « , + P - ( 1  - 0 O(ocr P ,^ X i (37)
Nevertheless, using Eq. 36 and 37 and Eq.32, one can write the necessary condition for Eq.34 
to be positive as:
(”>«-”J K a r+P /nW -nJ ) e»+(“ i+Pi(nPM'nJ 0' +
(VP/n™~V]a(1'0MK-PA>^+(arP,"<>J
(38)
Symmetrically to section 4.1, Eq. 38 is more likely to be verified the larger the difference 
between nv and nA> in each market, is. This means that:
Proposition 4: When a VAT system is in place at all stages of production, integrity and 
efficiency of the tax system are positively correlated.
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4.3 Multi stage vs mono-stage VAT
There are two great differences between a system where a tax rebate r  is given only in one stage 
of production (say stage s) and another where it is given in all stages of production (assume 
there are S stages).
First, in the former case, the VAT system chains only three stages of production (s-1, s, s+1), 
while in the latter case it chains all stages of production (from 1 to S). The monitoring 
possibilities given to the Tax Authorities are much greater under the VAT system and this 
reduces the likelihood of fraud.
Second, and related to the first, the implication in terms of integrity. When a tax rebate r  is 
given only in one stage of production (say stage s) the number of firms will be iv only from 
stage s-1 up to the last stage S, but nothing allows to assume it will be so between stage 1 and 
stage s-2, given that stages s-2 and s-1 are chained by the AVT system which allows different 
numbers of agents at different stages (see last paragraph of section 2). When a VAT system is 
extended to all stages of production, nv will be the number of agents in all markets and it will 
be equal to: n v= max {n1. . n g. . n j .
Both observations indicate that for a given tax rate the larger is the extent to which VAT is 
introduced, the larger is the effect on the integrity of the tax system. We also know from 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 that for a given tax structure (multi-stage or mono-stage VAT) the larger 
is r, the larger are the effects on integrity and on price reduction.
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5. Conclusions
Three contributions seem to appear from this paper.
1) Any movement from an ad valorem tax system, to a value added tax system increases the 
integrity of the tax system (i.e. the number of agents in the regular market). This is true if the 
value added tax is introduced only to some stages of production or to all stages of production. 
However, the increase in the number of agents is positively correlated with the extent to which 
VAT is introduced.
2) The increase in the efficiency of the tax system depends in turn on the increase in its 
integrity. The more additional people enter the regular market the higher tax revenues are.
3) The increased number of agents in the regular market causes a reduction in prices and an 
increase in quantities and thus boosts ever-honest consumers’ welfare.
The three above mentioned points answer to our initial question (which are the implications in 
terms of integrity and efficiency of the tax system of a shift from ad valorem tax to value added 
tax) and therefore justify the European Union requirement for VAT both on the ground of 
integrity and efficiency of the tax system and of consumers’ welfare. The first two criteria, as 
reasons for having a VAT, have been generally less quoted and less investigated than consumers’ 
welfare and production neutrality.
We believe that the main merit of this paper is having posed a new question and having 
attempted an answer through a very simple model. Nevertheless we are aware that our results 
have been derived under restrictive assumptions. Relaxing the strong assumption on the firms’
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production function (one unit of input is used by each firm to produce one unit of output) might 
allow to explain firms* choices of inputs and at firms’ choice of optimal production quantity. In 
the framework of our model, it is impossible to ascertain whether a VAT system encourages the 
substitution of labour input (which does not enjoy any subsidy) with capital input (which enjoys 
a subsidy) or more generally which are the distribution effects of reform towards a VAT system. 
This issue shall be the next step in our research.
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ANNEX 1
The purpose of this annex is to spell out the equilibrium characteristics of the model under VAT 
and its differences with AVT for each market. Table 1 summarizes the relevant equations, 
exogenous and endogenous variables of the model for both regimes.
Table 1
RAW MATERIAL MARKET VAT AVT
Equations (12), (13) (1), (2)
Exogenous &r> fin Yr> r^> L ®n fin Tr» ^n L
Endogenous Pvr> nVr ( = nV) ?Ar» ^Ar
INTERMEDIATE GOOD MARKET VAT AVT
Equations (15), (16) (3), (4)
Exogenous V^> ®i> fiii "Yii i^> fin Ti> i^> L
Endogenous PVj, 5vi A^i> A^i
FINAL GOOD MARKET VAT AVT
Equations (19), (20) (5), (6)
Exogenous nv, fiff af> fiff 7f> f^>
Endogenous < o* < A^f? nAf
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TEXT TO FIGURE 1
RAW MATERIAL MARKET: nVr and PVr are found solving simultaneously (12) and (13). By 
virtue of VAT the value of nVr is then kept unchanged for the other downstream markets. Notice 
that the introduction of r  among the parameters makes the demand curve to pivot (Eq. (12) has 
higher intercept and greater slope than Eq. (1)) around the would-be equilibrium point had taxes 
not been in place.
INTERMEDIATE GOOD MARKET. First Pvi is found by substituting nv into Eq. (15) and later 
the slope 5vi of Eq. (16) is found by substituting Pvi and nv into Eq. (16). The supply expand 
with respect to the AVT case (Eq. (16) is flatter than Eq. (4)).
FINAL GOOD MARKET. First Pvf is found by substituting nv into Eq. (19) and later the slope 
5vf of Eq. (20) is found by substituting Pvf and nv into Eq. (19). The supply expand with respect 
to the AVT case (Eq. (20) is flatter than Eq. (6)).
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Chapter 4
A NOTE ON CORRUPTION, PRODUCTION AND SHORTAGE
IN USSR AND RUSSIA
Mario Nava}
Centre fo r Economic Performance,
London School o f Economics
Abstract
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 argue that privatization increases production and reduces 
shortage; Komai, 1979 argues that privatization reduces both production and 
shortage. The transition from USSR to Russia reduced both production and shortage. 
We argue that this is just the result of the shrinking of the loss-making sector 
(industrial sector) and the expansion of the profit-making sector (the service sector 
and namely trade and retailing). We also argue that the validity of Komai’s model 
is limited to those firms which are overproducing (i.e. more than the profit 
maximization quantity) and the validity of Shleifer and Vishny’s model is limited to 
those firms which are underproducing. This reconciles two otherwise contradictory 
papers.
Keywords: corruption, privatization, shortage, transition.
1 My supervisor Kevin Roberts deserves the greatest thanks. Particular thanks are 
also due to Richard Layard who initiated me to Russia and to the Russian economy. 
This chapter has largely benefitted from close contacts with the teachers, namely 
Amos Witztum and John Board, and the 240 students of the 1993 and 1994 LSE 
Summer Schools in St.Petersburg and Moscow. Their continuous support and 
intellectual challenge has been invaluable. The usual disclaimers apply.
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1. Introduction
"The single most pervasive phenomenon in socialist countries is shortage2 of goods" 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This note aims to reconcile two well-known and prima 
facie mutually contradictory papers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 and Komai, 1979) 
both explaining the causes of shortage in USSR and possible reform programs. 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 explain shortage with underproduction which is due to 
centralized corruption. Komai explains shortage of consumer goods with overuse of 
goods as inputs to the industrial sectors. First, we will argue that, in Shleifer and 
Vishny’s model, "shortage" is actually a misnomer for "underproduction". Second, 
the apparent contradiction between the two models is given by the fact that Shleifer 
and Vishny’s model describes only those firms which are producing less than their 
profit maximizing quantity, while Komai’s model refers only to those firms which 
are producing more than their profit maximizing quantity. The two models therefore 
apply on two mutually exclusive subsets of firms.
The empirical evidence which at a first glance seems in favour of Komai (Russia has 
less total production and less shortage of goods than the USSR used to have) is 
indeed a confirmation of both models: production of goods has declined because of 
Komai’s effect and production of services (trade and retailing) has increased because
2 Both economists and non economists agree that looking at shortage is an useful 
way to look at Capitalism and Socialism. Following Komai (1979) and Weitzman 
(1984), excess supply of goods distinguish Capitalism while excess demand of goods 
distinguish Socialism. In the words of common people "In Luga region, cotton 
stockings are sold only for deceased, on presentation of death certificates by relatives 
and socks only to war invalids and afghan war veterans. And what should we, the 
living, wear?" (P.Slepets, Letters to Gorbachev, 1991, pg 28).
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of the Shleifer and Vishny’s effect thus reducing shortage.
The structure of this note is as follows: section 2 gives a partial description of the 
corruption in USSR and discusses the relationship between corruption and shortage 
through Shleifer and Vishny’s paper. Section 3 deals with the relationship between 
production and shortage and introduces Komai’s article. Section 4 illustrates the 
relationship between privatization, production and shortage and tries to reconcile the 
findings of both papers. Section 5 concludes.
2. Corruption and Shortage
There is a lot of anecdotal and real evidence about centralized corruption in USSR. 
Some excerpts from Remnick, 1993, help to make the point. "The Communist Party 
apparatus was the most gigantic mafia the world has ever known. It guarded its 
monopoly on power with a sham consensus and backed it up with the force of the 
KGB and the Interior Ministry police, (omissis) The trade mafia, [was] a pyramid of 
corruption that began in the Communist Party Central Committee and the top 
ministers and went all the way down to butchers, bakers and gravediggers, with 
everyone getting a piece". Andrei Fyodorov the man who opened the first cooperative 
restaurant in Moscow gives the following striking example of a monolithic mafia 
"The restaurant director’s salary is R190 a month, say. You can’t live on that, and 
so he is forced to take bribes. But there is a system of bribes in USSR. You cannot 
get too greedy. A restaurant director cannot take more than R2000/3000 per month. 
If he starts taking more, the system grows worried, and in the next five or six months
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new people will come around to inspect your place which means that you can be 
arrested for violating the unwritten code of bribery" (Remnick, 1993, pg 185-6). 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 argue that the Soviet shortage is due mainly to industry 
centralized corruption which dramatically reduces production. "The objective function 
of an industry is the objective function of the bureaucrats in the ministry and the 
managers of the firms" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Since they cannot keep for 
themselves the official profits of the industry, they are better off creating shortage 
and collecting bribes from consumers. Their objective function takes industry official 
revenues as total costs (what corrupted officers have to pay back to State) and 
chooses the quantity such that marginal revenues equate marginal costs, the price 
being determined on the demand function. The industry does indeed exploit its 
monopolistic position (P*, Q*). The difference between this price and the official state 
price is the per unit bribe. Production costs do not enter into the function given that
the State will cover any loss.
Official Price +  Bribe
Official Price
■Marginal Costs
The price charged is much higher than any monopoly price and the quantity produced 
is much lower. Two key assumptions in this model are that bureaucrats are self- 
interested and that, given strong entry barriers to the bribe market (just high official
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and bureaucrats can ask for them), a cartel of "bribees" is created to maximize total 
bribes. The lower the official price is, the more bribes can be extracted. Any attempt 
from the State, by increasing official prices (thus increasing firm marginal costs), to 
reduce bureaucrats possibility to collect bribes, has the same undesirable result (on 
price and quantity) as a per unit tax on a monopoly: it increases prices reducing the 
quantity produced. This can be a reason, among others, for the abnormally low prices 
in USSR3.
The analysis assumes that firms can choose the quantity to produce. Corruption 
reduces the profit maximizing quantity. A possible way out is privatization which 
allows the firm to retain profits so production would increase till the monopolistic 
level (Pm, Qm) and therefore reduce shortage.
Shleifer and Vishny’s model takes the "centralized corruption" as a fact and builds 
on it a possible explanation for shortage based on the fact that corruption reduces 
production. Were, for whatever reason, production to increase, shortage would 
automatically reduce.
Two key features of the Shleifer and Vishny’s model deserve attention.
First, despite its title, Shleifer and Vishny 1992 throws light on the relationship 
*corruption and production" and not "corruption and shortage *. In their article the 
concept of "shortage" and the concept of "underproduction" overlap. This approach
3 About possible social considerations leading to lower prices and a quantity 
rationing see Weitzman (1977).
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completely disregards distributive trades. In other words they make the implicit 
assumption that lack of production is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
shortage. Corruption can be taken as a cause of shortage only if both the necessary 
and the sufficient condition prove true. Otherwise corruption is only a cause of 
underproduction.
The sufficient conditions can be invalidated by imports: this is indeed the case of 
small open economies (Luxembourg, Arabian Emirates etc), but hardly the case of 
USSR which was basically a closed (within Comecon area) economy. Its share in the 
world turnover was one third that of the USA and half that of Japan. Per capita 
imports were 1/5 that of the USA and Japan and 1/12 that of Germany. This was 
mainly due to the rouble non-convertibility and to high, in real terms, custom 
duties4.
The necessary conditions can be invalidated by the existence of obstacles between 
production and consumption. In other words even in presence of an high level of 
production, goods might not reach consumers due to the imperfection of the 
distributive trade. Shortage may appear because there is no production of goods or 
because there is no production of the service of distributing goods or both. USSR 
statistics (provided one can rely on them) do not show such a significant "lack of
4 "Not long ago I received a present from United States. Its price was about $40 
or 1/60 of the average monthly pay of an American worker. I am a worker too. But 
1/60 of my pay is R4. Custom duties cost me R160 or 40/60 of my pay. I do not 
understand why I have to pay customs duties to the State because the State cannot 
provide me with essential goods. Why?" (V. Bochkarev, Letters to Gorbachev, 1991, 
pg 63).
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production" as argued in Shleifer and Vishny. USSR production consisted of many 
industries with a high degree of monopolization (some areas were identified by their 
only productive activity, for striking example see Remnick, 1993, pg 204-215). 
Products were distributed around the Soviet Union by state organizations under 
Central Planned orders. A discussion of the ability of the distributive system to 
spread goods across the whole Soviet seems a missing piece in Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992.
Second, they assume that Soviet firms had some degree of freedom in determining 
their output. This might have been true for those firms with "intangible output" like 
the firms in the service sector, but surely it was not true for firms in the industrial 
sector which had to respect (or at least to produce not less than) a centrally decided 
level of output. This second feature restricts the applicability of the Shleifer and 
Vishny’s model only to firms in the service sector.
3. Production and Shortage in the USSR.
The official explanation for shortage of goods goes as follows. "The economic 
Structure of the Soviet State is based on the socialist system of national economy and 
socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production (omissis). A planned 
economy rids society of the destructive influence of private competition and anarchy 
of production, and rules out economic crises, ensuring continuous growth of 
industrial production. The ultimate aim of production is to create an abundance of 
material and cultural wealth (omissis). In developing Soviet industry the stress was
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on the heavy industry (omissis). In order to carry out rapid industrialization the soviet 
people made great sacrifices, denying themselves many comforts and even the barest 
necessities. Therefore the output o f consumers goods lagged behind producer 
goods, (omissis). Heavy industry continues to develop at a somewhat faster rate than 
light industry. And this is to be expected since heavy industry forms the basis for the 
development of all other branches of national economy, including the consumer goods 
industry". (The Soviet Union, Everyman’s Book, 1967, pg 74-78, Italics added). 
The Hungarian economist Komai (1979) in a well known article offers an economic 
interpretation of the above-mentioned official explanation. Komai attributes the lack 
of consumer goods to the unfair competition between consumers and firms. 
Consumers face a hard budget constraint while firms face only a soft one. Indeed 
being losses automatically compensated by state, the firms’ demand is only limited 
by the plan. Firms, the managers of which are interested in producing as much as 
possible in order to over-fulfill the plan, may therefore buy everything and leave 
consumers "goodless". The common comment about this explanation is that it could 
be appropriate for intermediate goods, not for final goods (socks, shoes, cars, 
housing). Nevertheless, Komai does stress that lack of production and shortage are 
not the same concept. In Komai’s model we have shortage due to overproduction. 
This, of course, does not necessarily imply that a reduction in production reduces 
shortage. However, it does imply that lack of production is not a necessary condition 
for shortage. Indeed, shortage may arise because even if goods are produced they do
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not reach consumers due to different obstacles5. In Komai’s model firms are 
producing a quantity, decided by the Central Planner, much higher than the profit- 
maximizing one. Privatization would lead to produce the profit maximizing quantity 
and would therefore reduce total production.
4. Privatization, Production and Shortage
As soon as reforms took place and the former Soviet Union became the Russian 
Federation a new relationship among shortage, corruption and production developed. 
Corruption became much less organized and much more widespread6, shortage
5 Whenever I go to a chemist I am invariably met with the retort "sorry, no
cotton wool". Why is this the case when we are the world’s largest producer of
cotton wool? (I. Yelinetsaya, Letters to Gorbachev, 1991, pg 107). In the answer 
L.Relin, vice chairman of cotton industry, explains that this is due to lack of packing 
technology and to the huge demand of cottons wool for non-medical purposes. The 
latter part of the answer seems to confirm Komai’s point.
6 In a second paper, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, argue also that, if privatization 
in not carried on, during transition, production falls since there is a change in the 
structure of corruption. The above mentioned monolithic and monopolistic system of 
extorting bribes collapsed with the USSR and was replaced by a system where each 
official acts as an independent monopolist and tries to maximize his or her own 
revenues. In the Soviet Union all governments goods were allocated by joint 
monopolist agencies, in Russia by independent monopolistic agencies. In the first case
dx. dx.
the optimum is reached where: MRa MR,—J-=MC, V i j  and given—->0
Jdx. dx.
(governments goods or permits in the same industry are complementary goods) we
obtain MR<MC. Vi. In the second case MRi=MCi Vi. Clearly in the second case
production is lower, per unit price is higher and the aggregate level of bribes is
lower. This becomes even worse when there is free entry into collection of bribes.
If entry into the collection of bribes were completely free, the per unit bribe would
rise to infinity while production and bribe revenue fall to zero. As in any other
market it is therefore in the interest of the incumbent to restrict access.
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reduced and nearly disappeared and production dramatically collapsed. For corruption 
we have to rely on the empirical non-documental evidence, but some shortage and 
production data are available7.
Shortage has been reducing steadily since February 1992. The index of availability 
of goods (0 means no goods in any city, 100 means all goods in all 132 cities of the 
sample) which averaged, on aggregate, 61% during 1992, did rise, on aggregate, to 
80% by the end of 1994. It also shows that shortages are more prevalent for 
foodstuffs than for non-foodstuffs.
Production, measured by the Gross Domestic Product, fell by 19% in 1992, by 12% 
in 1993 and by 15% in 1994. In 1993 and 1994 the production of goods fell by 14% 
and 21% respectively, while the production of services fell by only 9% and 10%, 
respectively. In the period 1990-1994 the share of goods in the GDP has decreased 
from 60,6% to 43,5% while the share of services has increased from 32,4% to 
50,0%.
To summarize, Russian production is less than Soviet production, but more goods are 
on the shelves of Russian shops than they were on the shelves of Soviet shops, i.e. 
shortage is much reduced.
Privatization is the distinctive feature of the Russian transition towards market 
system. No other former socialist economy did better than Russia in privatizing 
small, medium and large firms. However the privatization process had a different
7 Data from Russian Economic Trends 1995, vol. 4, n.2.
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pace in different sectors. Among small-scale enterprises (retail trade, catering and 
services) privatized firms were, by mid 1994, roughly 75% of the market. In some 
regions small-scale privatization is almost complete. The process of industrial 
privatization took place mainly in 1993 and 1994 and some 75% of the industrial 
employment belongs now to privatized enterprises8. To focus on privatization allows 
for a solution of the apparent paradox "less shortage and less production".
As argued above, Komai’s model and the Shleifer and Vishny’s model give two 
opposite explanations to the shortage problem; however, shortage would disappear 
in both models if a widespread privatization program is implemented (as suggested 
by Shleifer and Vishny). If privatization continues, losses are not covered, the budget 
constraint becomes hard and net profits can be retained.
In Shleifer and Vishny’s model there will be a greater quantity produced at a lower 
price so shortage can be eliminated. In Komai’s model, firms will face a hard budget 
constraint. Loss-making firms will discontinue production, profit making firms will 
produce only till the profit maximizing quantity. The net effect will be negative: in 
aggregate, firms will produce fewer goods and therefore will require less inputs so 
that more goods will be left to consumers.
The Komai’s model seems to fit the facts accurately. Firms now face a hard budget 
constraint, they require less inputs and thus they produce less (total production falls). 
Consumers and firms compete fairly to get goods therefore the consumers’ slice is
8 However, "privatization de jure cannot yet be equated with privatization de 
facto , as many entreprise managers have continued to operate as under state 
ownership" (RET, Vol.3, N.2).
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bigger than beforehand (shortage is reduced).
On the other hand, looking at disaggregate data of production, the present situation 
can be seen as an evidence in favour of Shleifer and Vishny’s model as well. The 
production of those sectors where privatization has been more extensive (service 
sector) has fallen much less9 (and in few cases has even risen) than the production 
of those sector where privatization is still incomplete (the industrial goods sector). It 
is therefore safe to claim that reduction in shortage has been brought about by 
privately and domestically produced goods (the Russian trade surplus has been 
positive since 1992 though it is believed there is a large amount of unregistered 
illegal imports) and increased efficiency of the privatized distributive sector (shops 
privatization is basically complete).
5. Conclusions
On one hand, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992 argue that shortage is caused by corruption 
(i.e. self-interest bureaucrats collecting bribes from consumers) and privatization (to 
allow to appropriate profits) would eliminate shortage. On the other hand, Komai, 
1979, argues that shortage is caused by overproduction and unfair competition 
between firms (who face a soft budget constraint) and individuals (who face an hard 
budget constraint). Firms privatization, during the transition from USSR to Russia,
9 In addition to the data mentioned at the beginning of this section, a striking 
evidence is given by agriculture. In 1994 the share of households on the total land 
is no more than 5%, while the share of agricultural state enterprises is about 90%: 
the former produces 36% of the total gross agricultural output, the latter only 62%!
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has reduced total production but has also dramatically reduced shortage.
First, we argued that what is referred as shortage in Shleifer and Vishny’s model is 
indeed underproduction. Second, we argued that both forecasts were correct since 
they applied to two mutually exclusive subsets of firms: Komai’s forecast on 
privatization applies to those firms producing more than the profit maximizing 
quantity and having a minimum level of production determined by the plan, while 
Shleifer and Vishny’ s forecast applies to those producing less than the profit 
maximizing quantity and having freedom in choosing their level of production. 
Typically, industrial firms belonged to the first subset and were loss-making ones, 
while service firms belonged to the second subset and were profit-making ones. This 
explain the apparent Russian paradox of "less production and less shortage". It is the 
joint result of the Komai’s effect on the industrial sector which has greatly reduced 
production (total production has fallen since most previously loss-making firms have 
stopped production) and of the Shleifer and Vishny’ effect on the service sector, 
namely trade and retailing (profit-making firms have mushroomed in the service 
sector) which has greatly reduced shortage.
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Chapter 5
LABOUR MARKET REALLOCATION AND RENT-SEEKING IN 
TRANSITION ECONOMY
Mario Nava1 
Centre for Economic Performance,
London School o f Economics
Abstract
We present a simple two-sector model of the Russian labour market. Starting from 
a "full-employment" equilibrium with no search (the USSR), we analyze the path to 
the new equilibrium with unemployment and search (Russia). The links between the 
fraction of people searching, the wage differential and the hiring and firing 
probability of both sectors are investigated. A tentative way to compute these 
probabilities is proposed starting from recent (91-94) Russian data on unemployment 
and wages. It is shown that the wage differential across sectors rises with the 
strengthening of the entry barriers. It is argued that if no action is taken by the 
Authorities to fight unemployment and to reduce the wage differential across sectors 
(e.g. relaxing the entry barriers to the most productive sector), the market will react 
by developing, as an endogenous alternative to unemployment, a third sector which 
would act as a rent seeking one against the most productive sector. This will increase 
the outflow of workers from the least productive sector. Finally, it is shown that if 
the fraction of rent-seeking people attains a critical mass the above-mentioned policies 
may not be enough to rid the economy of the rent-seeking sector.
Keywords: labour market, rent-seeking, Russia, transition.
1 Special thanks are due to my supervisor, Kevin Roberts, for his dedication to 
my work, which has contributed to improve dramatically this chapter. A first version 
of this paper was presented to the 1995 EEA Conference (Prague). I am grateful to 
all participants, and especially to Josef Konings, for their stimulating comments. 
Sharp and precise suggestions from Mick Keen have considerably improved the final 
version. The usual disclaimers apply.
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1. Introduction
This paper tries to explain labour market adjustments during the transition from 
Socialism to Capitalism in Russia. We will propose a model to describe the path from 
a full-employment equilibrium with no search and no wage differential across sectors 
(the USSR) to an equilibrium with unemployment, with search and wage differential 
across sectors (Russia). We will argue that the transition to the market, especially 
privatization, the most successful and widespread reform in Russia, provoked a 
positive technological shock to the trade sector and a negative one to the industrial 
sector. Privatization in the trade sector wiped out shortage and brought goods back 
to Russian consumers. Hard budget constraints and incomplete privatization in the 
industrial sector reduced production. Labour attracted by the highest expected wage 
in the trade sector tries to move away from the lowest productive market and enter 
the highest productive market. There are entry barriers to the highest productive 
market which prevents wages equalizing thus pushing people into the unemployment 
pool. Workers require a minimal wage differential (changing with the fraction of 
people searching) to wish to enter the trade sector. This means that, when the wage 
differential is very wide, many workers are trying to get into the trade sector and 
some of them end up unemployed. The movement of workers from one sector to the 
other will bring the economy to a final equilibrium with a lower wage differential 
across sectors. We show that an effective Government policy to fight unemployment 
would not increase unemployment benefits, but would reduce the wage gap between 
markets through complete privatization of the industrial sector and/or the relaxation
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of the entry barriers to the trade sector. In the absence of intervention we show that 
a black sector (where earnings are higher than unemployment benefits) could appear 
and tempt those who become unemployed. Finally, it is argued that once the black 
sector has appeared and developed, it tends to stay even if the previous obstacles to 
completion of the transition towards market economy are removed. This allows for 
the second policy conclusion: the timing of the Government intervention matters for 
its effectiveness, the earlier the better.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the new Russian labour 
market. In section 3 we present a model aimed at describing the labour market 
equilibrium. After introducing model assumptions in subsection 3.1, in subsection 3.2 
we use a model similar to the well-known Harris Todaro (1970) model to illustrate 
the labour market changes due to the transition from the planned economy to the 
market economy. In subsection 3.3 we discuss Government policies to fight 
unemployment. Recent Russian data to give numerical values to the parameters of the 
model are presented in subsection 3.4. In the last two subsections 3.5 and 3.6 
possible developments of the equilibrium are discussed when a rent-seeking sector 
appears. Section 4 concludes.
2. Labour Market in Russia2.
The labour market changes have been the most dramatic of all. In the USSR, jobs
2 This section draws on "Labour Market Adjustment in Russia" by Richard 
Layard and Andrea Richter special report on RET, (1994), Vol.3, N.2. A revised 
version of it is also published in Aslund (1995).
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were assigned centrally and wages were substantially equal across sectors being 
disconnected from the workers’ productivity. In Russia, jobs are now allocated 
through a decentralized hiring and firing process and wages are largely different 
across sectors. Privatized sectors have higher average productivity than non-privatized 
sectors. The society is now divided in classes of different income: those who are 
working in a de facto privatized sector and, those who are working in a still non­
privatized sector and the those who are currently unemployed or underemployed. 
Unemployment reached 7.7% by June 1995 and underemployment 5.6%. This figures 
are very low compared to western ones especially when one relates this to the large 
decline in production described chapter 4.
Several explanations have been given for the relatively low rate of unemployment. 
Wage flexibility plays an important role in providing job security to workers (in ipid 
1994 the minimum wage was roughly 8 % of the average wage). Firms have financial 
and strategic reasons not to fire workers: 1) the excess wage tax which entitles firms 
to pay less taxes, keeping employees at the minimum wage rather than firing them3.
2) the high severance costs: unemployment benefits for the first 3 months (equal to 
100% of the last nominal wage) are paid by employers. 3) access to cheap 
government credit may be linked to the number of employees. 4) managers have a 
paternalistic attitude towards workers due to long-time acquaintance and many 
workers are now shareholders in privatized enterprises.
3 See Roxborough and Shapiro, 1994 or RET, 1994, Vol.3, N.2. For a 
generalization of both see OECD, 1995)
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Employees prefer to earn the minimum wage, staying on the books of the firm, than 
earning unemployment benefits even if the latter are initially higher because 1) 
unemployment benefits are in nominal terms and in the long run they tend to become 
negligible; only approximately one third of those who are out of job bother to register 
as unemployed. 2 ) dissociating from the firm, workers lose most of the in kind 
benefits like free or subsidized meals and food, retraining and education, housing and 
health care and the use of enterprise’s tools for some petty second job. Finally 3), 
membership of a firm is still a source of social identity. The above-mentioned reasons 
may explain why job reallocation has been for Russia a phenomenon more important 
than generally in Western Economies.
3. A Model of Labour Market in Transition
In this section we provide a model aiming to explain the present labour market 
equilibrium. There are only two sectors in the economy paying two different wage 
rates. Workers migrate from one sector to the other maximizing expected utility. This 
leads, as in the Harris-Todaro’s model to the existence of an equilibrium with 
considerable unemployment, which is bound to create an increasing social discontent. 
We will claim that, in the absence of an exogenous intervention eliminating what 
causes unemployment and what prevents the equalization of the wage rates, workers 
in the unemployment pool, following the expected utility rule, would gather together 
and form a third unofficial sector. The third sector, under some mild assumption, will 
eventually absorb most of the workers from the least paying sector and will lead to
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wage rate equalization with even bigger official unemployment and a larger black 
economy. It is shown that it would be easier for the Government to act so as to avoid 
the development of a black sector than to get rid of it once it has developed.
3.1 Model Assumptions
No doubt the low rate of unemployment in Russia coupled with the collapse of gross 
domestic product (GDP) is one of the major economic puzzles to be explained. Our 
model tries to describe the movement in the labour market following the transition 
from USSR to Russia. We make the following assumption.
1) There are no new entrants in the labour market (we are looking at the short run).
2) There are two sectors: "industrial" and "trade". Their production function are: 
L=l(n,,jS) and T=t(nt,a). For both functions the first derivative with respect to n is 
positive and the second is negative; n, associated with the respective subscript, stands 
for the number of employed in each sector; a  and 0  are variables containing 
institutional and technological factors.
3) Soviet workers of both sectors used to get a salary disconnected from their
T+Lproductivity: — F° r the Russian economy we assume first that an exogenous
shock has modified the initial values of Wt and W, and later we treat wages 
endogenously. The russian wage is a function of the productivity of the sector, the 
number of agents in the sector and the entry barriers to the sector:
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W=---------------and W,=------   ; where 0^ Xz 1, Standard assumptions
wr ni
dWt dWt dW, dW.
of decreasing marginal productivity imply: -----< 0  , ------ < 0  and -----< 0  , ----- <0 .
dnt dx nt dX
4) X, r  are probabilities (O^A.^1 , O^x^l). X is the probability of staying in (i.e. not 
being fired from) the industrial sector, r  is the probability of entering (i.e. the 
probability of being hired from) the trade sector. In the command economy there was 
no across sectors mobility. Therefore, by definition, the probability of staying in the 
industrial sector was 1 and the probability of entering in the trade sector was zero 
(X=l, r=0). Since transition began this has changed and mobility across sector has 
become possible. We assume, without loss of generality, that the probability of 
staying in the industrial sector is still higher than the probability of entering in the 
trade sector: X >r. To assume that wage decreases with the relaxation of entry 
barriers means to assume that wage decreases when industry expands.
5) Russian workers have a standard well-behaved utility function increasing in 
consumption and leisure. If there are two sectors with different wages, workers will 
maximize their utility selling labour in the sector where the (expected) hourly wage 
is higher.
6 ) Hiring and firing do not take place simultaneously: if the number of workers 
increases by n units from period t to period t + 1 , we simply assume that n new 
workers have been hired.
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7) We treat X, r  as parameters and we look at wage changes due to workers 
migration from one sector to another. For any value of X and r, the solution will be 
characterized by a different S (fraction of people searching) and W/W, (wage 
differential between the trade and the industrial sector).
3.2 Model Solution
From what has been said in Section 2 and in the part A of this chapter it is safe to 
assume that the Russian labour market witnesses a great deal of searching on the job. 
Were searching on the job costless, a worker in the industrial sector would try to 
move to the trade sector if the trade sector expected wage is higher than the industrial 
sector expected wage:
x W+( 1 -x)[A W ^ l  -X) W ^X W fQ . -X) Wpwhere:
x e[0 ,l] = probability o f entering in the trade sector (1)
X e[0,l] = probability o f staying in the industrial sector 
Wb = unemployment benefits, where Wb<WpWf
Inequality (1) holds as long as Wt^XW ^{l-X)W b. This gives the result that workers
in the industrial sector may be searching even for WtzWl (Wt greater than or equal
to W, is only sufficient for Eq.l to be verified).
We now assume that searching on the job is costly, in the sense that it alters the 
probability of staying in the industrial sector. In section 2 we argued about four 
reasons why employers may be reluctant to fire their workers. The first three reasons 
apply to the whole workforce, while the fourth (paternalism) might not necessarily 
apply to the whole of it. We assume that those workers who search on the job signal
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themselves as readier to leave than those who do not search on the job and somehow 
show less attachment to the firm. Employers, if compelled to fire someone, will 
therefore choose from the set of those who are searching. All workers have the same 
probability of entering in the trade sector.
For each couple X, r  three different equilibria exist:
1) The Mno-search equilibrium (S=0V'. When no one is searching for a job in the 
trade sector, the marginal agent, if searching, has probability 1 of being fired ( 0  of 
staying in) from the industrial sector, if not searching he has only probability (1-X) 
of being fired (prob X of staying) from the industrial sector. The marginal agent will 
start searching for a job in the trade sector if:
xWi+(l-x)Wb^XWl+(l-X)Wb (2)
therefore there will be a no-search equilibrium if:
W  l
(3)
Wt T
assuming for simplicity Wb=0. Note that this equilibrium is a comer solution and it 
is stable since it holds for all W/W, smaller than the X/r.
2) The "everyone searching equilibrium (S = 1V*. When everyone is searching for a 
job, the marginal agent, if not searching, has probability zero of being fired (1  of 
staying) from the industrial sector while if searching he or she has probability (1-X) 
of being fired (prob. X of staying). He or she will continue searching if:
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xW+(l -t)[A IV,+(1 -*) Wy ;> W, (4)
The everyone searching equilibrium will be reached when:
(5)
Wt T
still assuming for simplicity Wb=0. Again this is a stable equilibrium holding for all 
values of W/W, satisfying Eq. 5. We may term the RHS of Eq. (3) and (5) the 
"workers’ minimum excess wage ratio” meaning that any risk neutral worker would 
leave the industrial sector for the trade sector if the excess wage ratio is greater than 
the RHS. The economic intuition is transparent: when the excess wage differential 
(the wage differential in excess of the unemployment benefits) between the trade 
sector and the industrial sector is wide, people are motivated to search for a trade 
job. This unfortunately increases their chances to finish into the unemployment pool. 
In a competitive market without barriers we would expect the wages of both sectors 
to equalize due to the flow of workers from labour to trade. At equilibrium we would 
Wr Wb
obtain: x= =1. In a market where the entry into the trade sector is restricted
Wt-Wb
and controlled by the incumbent ( r< X < l)  we observe wage differential across 
sector.
3) The "someone searching equilibrium 0 < S < 1 M. Both the S=0 and the S = 1 
strategy lead to wage differential between the trade sector and the industrial sector. 
To analyze how the wage differential changes with S, assuming as above Wb=0, let
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us rewrite equation 2 and 4 as follows: 
t W^XWj
t w ^ i - x +x^
This shows that moving from S=0 to S = l, the probability of entering into the trade 
sector is unchanged, while the coefficient of W, changes. This coefficient, for any 
value of S, is the difference between the probability o f staying in the industrial sector 
fo r the non searching agent and the probability o f staying in the industrial sector for 
the searching agent. By construction this difference is always positive and changes 
from X to (1-A.+At) . In other words is, at any value of S, the gain, measured in
terms of probability of staying in the industrial sector, of the non searching agent 
with respect to the searching agent (the "probability premium"). This can be 
generalized taking the linear approximation of the probability premium function for 
any values of S which is therefore equal to:
p£S) =X+(l-2X+Xx)S (7)
A unique expression, for Eq. 2 and 4, can therefore be written as: 
t  Wt7>[X +(I -2X +Xx)S1 Wt (8 )
which in terms of excess wage differential can be written as:
W ,.. [X+(1-2A.+Xt)S]
w i x
Pj(S), the numerator of the function on the RHS of Eq. 9 takes the known values of:
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X for S=0 and 1-X+Xx for S=1. Pj(S) is downward sloping ifX ^-J—
2 - t
(corresponding to zone A in figure 1) and upward sloping if the reverse is true. If X
 1 ..............................................................................................
and r  are such that X =----- , the function is horizontal. For any given value of S, the
"probability premium” of staying in the industrial sector for the non searching agent 
increases with r  (Fig. 3), since when r  increases the probability of staying in the 
industrial sector for the searching agent decreases. However, P^SVr, the RHS of Eq. 
9, which can be interpreted as the excess wage differential "required" by workers in 
order to search decreases with r, since the probability of entering the trade sector is 
higher (Fig. 2)4.
The Wt/W, function, the LHS of Eq. 9, which can be interpreted as the "actual" 
excess wage differential, is downward sloping with S (see assumption 3), and moves 
closer and closer to the origin with r  going from 0 to 1. (Fig. 4).
When Eq. 9 is verified with equality (the actual excess wage differential is equal to 
the required excess wage differential) the equilibrium values of S and Wt/Wj are 
simultaneously determined. (Fig. 5 is obtained superposing fig. 4 and fig. 2) (to
4 Fig. 2 and 3 can be also understood observing that for any fixed X and r, if the 
"probability premium" for the non-searching agent decreases with S, the excess wage 
differential necessary to search for a job in the trade market decreases as well; if the 
"probability premium" increases with S, the excess wage differential necessary to 
search for a job in the trade market increases as well. (Fig. 2 and 3 are drawn for 
a fixed value of X=3/4 and with r  going from 0,15 to 1; the numerical values are 
calculated in Annex 1.)
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insure stability let us assume for a moment that the actual W^W, function is steeper 
than P1(S)/r, the required W/Wj). Not surprisingly they depend on X and r. Generally 
speaking, the higher is t , for a fixed X, the lower the excess wage differential and 
the lower the equilibrium value of S.
We can have two types of solutions S <  1 (more likely the higher r  is) and S = 1 
(more likely the lower r  is). A S < 1 solution is associated with a lower excess wage 
differential than a S = 1 solution. If the Wt/W, function is less steep than the Pi(S)/r, 
when t  rises the equilibrium value of Wt/W, still falls, but S = 1 (comer solution) 
remains the only stable equilibrium value.
Proposition 1. For any given X, the more relaxed the entry barriers to the trade 
sector are, the smaller will be the equilibrium wage differential across sectors 
and the fraction of people searching.
To summarize, when equation 3 is verified, no search will take place and the 
equilibrium is a comer solution S =0. If equation 3 is not verified, some search will 
take place and the move from the old system to transition determines an internal 
equilibrium if and only if it exist an 0<S*< 1 such that Eq. 9 is verified. Finally, 
when equation 4 is verified for S*=l the solution is again a comer solution and 
everyone in the industrial sector is searching for a job in the trade sector.
The comer solution S=0 can be interpreted as the ossification of the "Soviet system". 
The transition is only equal to an initial shock to wages with no reaction from the 
side of the workers.
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The S > 0 solution reflects the workers’ reaction to the initial shock and a path to the 
transition equilibrium. The reaction of the workers to the changed situation leads to 
a different labour market equilibrium. The reaction will have a different impact on 
the labour market equilibrium depending on the value of the parameters (the entry 
barriers to the sector). When X and r  are of comparable magnitude (the probability 
of staying in the industrial sector is similar to the probability of being hired by the 
trade sector) internal equilibria are more likely to be attained. On the contrary, if the 
probability of staying in the industrial sector is much greater than the probability of 
being hired by the trade sector, the internal solution, if any, will have an higher 
equilibrium value of Wt/W,.
The comer solution S = 1 can be interpreted as unfinished transition: despite the fact 
that all workers are searching for a job in the trade sector, the entry barriers prevent 
a further reduction of the wage differential. The lower the value of t  is, for a fixed 
X, the more likely is to obtain a comer solution S = l. State intervention seems 
necessary.
As in any other dynamic story it is necessary to assume that an autonomous 
spontaneous belief spreads among agents so that suddenly S> 0. In this case we 
assume that the political events together with the establishment of a new socio­
economic system play the role of coordination device to allow S >  0.
3.3 Government policies: the exogenous solution
We assume that at equilibrium two main issues worry the Government:
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unemployment and social cohesion. As described in the previous section some 
workers have been fired from the industrial sector and have not managed to enter the 
trade sector. The pool of unemployed people has therefore increased and society is 
split into three main income classes: trade workers, labour workers and unemployed 
workers. A reasonable Government policy is to fight unemployment and/or to keep 
wage differentials within acceptable limits.
We briefly analyze two kinds of policies: administrative and market ones. 
Administrative policies imply transfers from the "richer" to the "poorer" (namely to 
increase unemployment benefits and eventually to allow for transfers to the industrial 
sector workers). Transfers would be effective only if an efficient progressive system 
of taxation were in place and workers in the trade sector would bear the largest 
share. But given the current different degree of tax compliance between workers of 
the trade and the industrial sector, it would not be surprising if an increased taxation 
to finance social benefits would increase the gap between net incomes. Therefore to 
increase social benefits would be not only ineffective but even harmful: the excess 
wage differential will become even wider thus giving a greater incentive to leave the 
industrial sector for the trade sector and increasing the number of unemployed 
people.
Market policy options should be consistent with the other reforms implemented to 
move the economy system from a command economy to a market economy. In this 
particular case a Government policy should facilitate the system to reach the free- 
market equilibrium and possibly full employment. This can be done in two non
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mutually exclusive ways: a) a positive technological shock to the industrial sector 
such as to further promote a privatization program in the industrial sector and thus 
facilitating its entry into the market; b) Better regulation of the trade sector and 
eventually the relaxation of its entry barriers.
In terms of our model both policies result in changing the initial values of the 
parameters X and r  (we assumed r < \ <  1). Policy sub a) would allow the industrial 
sector to reduce X, thus having X and r  of comparable magnitude. Policy sub b) 
would increase r  for a given X. Let us focus on the policy sub b). State intervention 
will presumably take place when for any the following holds:
wX5)^ + ( i -2A.+;it),s
W/iS) T
The policy sub b) will move the system toward an equilibrium with lower S and 
lower wage differential. (See figure 5). The relaxation of the entry barrier to the 
trade sector seems therefore a relative painless solution facilitating transition, labour 
market reallocation and easing social tensions.
3.4. Empirical Data
In the rest of the paper we treat X and r  as parameters. Just to have a feeling about 
their possible values we propose in this subsection to calculate them looking at the 
unemployment data of the labour and trade sector since privatization started. Our 
estimates are quite crude and there is of course no claim that they are near their 
correct values.
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These simulations are shown in Annex 2. Table 1 is our reduction of Table 74 in 
RET 94/3/2 and Table 87 in RET 94/3/4. Under the entry "Trade" we include all 
sectors (trade, catering, commercial services, health, sport, education) paying higher 
wages and under the entry "Labour" we include all sectors (industry, agriculture, 
transports, construction, science and public administration) paying lower wages. 
Residual workers are accounted with the Trade sector.
From table 1, we calculate the series of tables 2. They give a numerical value to the 
parameters of our model.
Some assumptions are needed in order to calculate X and r. To calculate X for the 
period (t, t+n) we simply divide the number of workers in the industrial sector at 
period (t+n) by the number of workers in the industrial sector at period t. To 
calculate r  (the probability of successfully entering the trade sector) we need to know 
how many workers of the industrial sector searched for a job in the trade sector. We 
assume that this figure is equal to k times the number of agents who finally separated 
from the industrial sector; since we can indeed observe 6 (numbers of people who 
entered the trade sector divided by number of people who left the industrial sector) 
we therefore obtain r=0/k. Clearly, the value of k plays a crucial role and therefore 
we have run the simulation for 3 different values of k. (Tables 2a to 2c). In each of 
these tables the required W/W, and the "premium probability" are calculated for 
three different values of S (0, 0.5, 1).
We have chosen 4 periods relevant for the analysis. One of them, 93Q1-91, (93Q1 
means the first quarter of 93) has been further divided in two sub-periods.
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Commenting on the simulations we focus on table 2b, which means to assume that 
the number of workers who left the industrial sector is just one third of those who 
were searching for a job in the trade sector. Let us first have a look at the column 
94Q4-91 which gives an overall evaluation of labour market movements from the 
starting of privatization to the most recent available data. Generally, it can be 
observed that the industrial sector has been a job destructor sector throughout 
transition, while the trade sector has been always (except in the period 93-93Q1) a 
job creator sector. However the trade sector has not absorbed all those workers 
leaving the industrial sector which has resulted in an increase in the number of 
unemployed. The probability of staying in the industrial sector has kept stable over 
all periods, while the probability of being hired in the trade sector has widely 
fluctuated. In terms of our model, it means that in the period 94Q4-91, for a given 
X and r  both the excess wage differential necessary to search and the "premium 
probability" decrease when going from S=0 to S = 1 (being A>1/(2-t)). The value 
of required excess wage differential is quite high as a consequence of the fact that 
X=.87 while 7 =. 14. (Figure 6  and 7)
In the sub-period 93Q1-92 when the highest values of 7 are observed (though 
X>1/(2- t) still holds). The required excess wage ratio is relatively small. In this 
period reallocation has played a major role: the trade sector has hired as many new 
workers as have separated from the industrial sector.
Looking at the whole period not all the fired workers from the industrial sector are 
hired by the trade sector and the average wage of the trade sector is consistently
133
greater than the average wage of the industrial sector. These two findings seem to 
point to the existence of resistant entry barriers controlled by the incumbents which 
prevents the equalization of average wages. Though data on the wage in the trade 
sector are difficult to interpret given the great deal of underreporting for purpose of 
tax evasion, it seems that, despite the new hirings over the whole period, the wage 
differential across sectors did not reduce. One possible explanation, among many 
others, is that the trade sector prevents its own wage to decrease by accepting new 
workers only when showing increasing returns to scale and expelling workers when 
showing decreasing returns to scale. At that point those who leave the industrial 
sector can enter only into the unemployment pool. The equilibrium therefore is not 
characterized, as usual, by the same average wage across both sectors, but is an 
equilibrium with a wage differential.
3.5 The Black Sector: the endogenous solution
In the present section we look at how market forces can overcome the entry barriers 
and move the system away from the equilibrium unemployment. We make the 
hypothesis that Russian unemployed workers’ may enter into a third unofficial sector 
termed the "black sector" which can be thought of as a sector in some way related 
to the black or the grey economy5. In other words, a growing social discontent due 
to the wage gap among sectors, to the growing unemployment and to the state non
5 To be precise with "black sector" we mean legal and illegal "Directly 
Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) activities" as christened by Bhagwati (1982). 
This seems to fit with Russian reality.
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implementation of adequate active policies, may lead some unemployed workers to 
"privatize" themselves by joining a third unofficial sector. We assume that, social 
attitudes are such that workers prefer to earn a given amount of money in any of the 
regular sectors rather than in the black sector. Money earned in the black sectors, to 
be comparable to money earned in any regular sector need therefore to be discounted 
by a factor accounting for "moral costs". The "net wage" of the rent seeking sector 
is thus the difference between M, the rent extracted from the trade sector and m, the
h
moral costs of being involved in rent-seeking activities: W =M-m= n
nm
tn
where nm is the number of workers in the black sector and /x (pe[0 ,l]) the 
probability of entering the black sector). This wage function is similar to the one of 
the trade and industrial sector except for the r^/n variable which represents the 
fraction of people in the rent-seeking sector and allows to determine moral costs. It
is standard to assume - ^ - < 0  and - ^ - < 0  to describe the decreasing marginal
dnm dnmm  ftx
productivity of the black sector and the negative relationship between personal moral 
costs and the fraction of people working in the black sector (for a discussion, see
Cowell, 1990). Therefore it is possible to assume that for some values of the first
and the second derivative of Wm with respect to nm are positive, for some other 
values of nm the first derivative is positive and the second negative and for some
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other values of nm the first is negative. In other words it is possible to find a range 
of values nm for which the net wage of the rent-seeking sector is an increasing 
function of (See figure 8). Ceteris paribus, equation 2 and 4 are replaced as 
follows by equation 11 and 13, respectively. In the case S=0 the marginal agent will 
start searching if:
xWs\LWm+ (l-x-v)W b>\Wl+{\-X)Wb (11)
where (again assuming Wb=0) the S=0 equilibrium will remain if: 
xW+pWm<.XWl (12)
In the case S = l, the marginal agent will continue searching if:
(13)x\vt+\L wm+(i - t  -  p)[A w^+(i -X) wj  ^  wi
where (again assuming Wb=0) an S = 1 equilibrium is reached if: 
xW+pWmzW£l-X+xX+\iX) (14)
The set of values for which S = 0 leads to a greater excess wage differential than S = 1 
is:
A.i(l-X+Ti+(iA.)-*A.i— -—  (15)
2 -T -p
The weaker the entry barriers are to the black sector (the higher p is), the smaller the 
area A in figure 1 is. In other words the bigger p is, the less are the combinations
of X, r  such that Xz— -— . This is due to the fact that if a third sector springs up, 
2 - x - p
136
the true choice is between taking the risk in the industrial sector or in the trade 
sector. If the trade sector offers also outside options (the black sector) the marginal 
agent is ready to risk the trade sector even if the risk is greater than in the industrial 
sector (X relatively close to, but still greater than, r).
Using equation 12 and 14, the linear approximation, for 0 < S <  1, of the "premium 
probability" function of staying in the industrial sector for the non-searching agent 
can be calculated as:
t  W 'tik +[1 -2X+X(t+vj\S}Wr \iWm (16)
With respect to the /x=0 case we have smaller intercept and greater slope. The line 
of the requested minimum wage differential to move from one sector to another turns 
anti-clockwise (See Figure 10).
We have carried on some calculations for the case where r=0.15, being the case of 
a low r  the one which gives the highest incentive to people to create a rent-seeking 
sector. Three different values of p (0.20, 0.52 and 1) have been considered to
analyze the case where X z— -—  is verified, the case where X<:— -—  is verified
2 - x - p  2 - x - p
and the borderline. A sufficient condition to obtain the anti-clockwise movements is 
simply Wm>W,. For any value of S the equilibrium value of the excess wage 
differential (between the labour and the trade market) is smaller when p > 0. (Figure 
10 and the last table of annex 3). The existence of the rent-seeking sector gives a 
further incentive for people to search. Comer solutions become more likely. For any
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0 < S < 1 the interpretation is transparent: the existence of a third sector allows for 
equilibria with a smaller wage differential between the trade and the industrial sector. 
It means that the existence o f a third sector increases the outflow o f workers from the 
industrial sector under each strategy. Some will enter the trade sector, some the 
unemployment pool and some the black sector. The wage will increase in the labour 
and in the black sector and decrease in the trade sector. At equilibrium we will 
observe a high Wm and low Wt and W, (eventually for X smaller than r, Wt could be 
smaller than W,). Indeed, the value of Wt, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1992 
and 1993), depends negatively on the number of people in DUP activities. This will 
be the logical result of an increasing number of "Directly Unproductive and Profit- 
Seeking" agents.
Proposition 2: The existence of the rent seeking sector paying net wages 
increasing with the number of workers (at least for some values of nm) crowds 
out both the trade and the industrial sector. Ceteris paribus, for any internal 
equilibrium, the value of S will be higher and the value of Wt/W, lower than in 
the no-rent-seeking case. The final equilibrium may be such that Wm>WfiWr
The entry barriers to the trade sector, as a way to keep wages high, have been proved 
not only ineffective, but also harmful. Since entry barriers existed, a rent-seeking 
sector developed, leading in turn to the reduction of wages in the trade sector.
This new equilibrium implies even more unemployment than in a standard Harris- 
Todaro situation. Endogenous market forces, coupled with a weak institutional 
framework, may overcome entry barriers through DUP activities and reach an even
worse unemployment equilibrium. The DUP sector drags resources from the most 
productive sector thus reducing the effectiveness of entry barriers to the trade sector 
as a mean to keep trade wages higher. Any legal sector could not nullify the effect 
of entry barriers unless it proves able to pay higher wages than the trade sector. This 
makes the rising of a DUP sector more likely than the rising of any other legal 
sector. This process could even enter in a vicious circle such that DUP activities 
reduce to zero legal productive activity and the whole system is just a society of DUP 
persons.
Policy conclusions are self-evident. The most likely reaction of the market to a device 
(entry barriers) which allows a sector to be protected is another device (DUP 
activities) which somehow mitigates or annuls the effects of the first device. In other 
words in the absence of any exogenous intervention (as one of those advocated in 
section 3.3) or any exogenous technological shock to the industrial sector a DUP 
sector will become the strongest of the market.
3.6: The Black Sector hysterisis
The exogenous and endogenous solutions as they were presented in sections 3.3 and
3.5 respectively, seem two most likely outcomes for the Russian economy. Let us 
assume that in the short run the Government decides not to intervene and therefore 
the economy goes towards the so-called endogenous solution. Given that the 
Government cannot consider it as a satisfactory outcome, what are the policy options 
left to it rid the economy of the rent-seeking sector? In other words, at that stage can
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the economy still evolve (by itself or helped by opportune Government actions) 
towards a "rent-seekingless" free market economy?
We maintain the same hypotheses as in the previous sections. Let us also assume that 
during a considerable period of time a significant number of workers have been 
moving away from the industrial sector to either an emerging and strong rent-seeking 
sector or to the unemployment pool, because of entry restrictions to the trade sector. 
The authorities now decide to intervene implementing any of the policies advocated 
in section 3.3 like promoting privatization or allowing for price liberalization in the 
industrial sector or reducing/abolishing entry barriers in the trade sector. Both 
unemployed and black sector workers may try moving back to the industrial sector. 
Again let us assume agents maximize expected utility, the unemployed would simply 
move back to the industrial sector if:
xW +\W l+ (\-\-x)l\LW m+ (l-\L )W ^W b (17)
Given that W^Wb and WM^ Wb (the first is a basic incentive mechanism the second
is a necessary condition for the existence of the black sector), we obtain the obvious 
result that, for any positive X and r, unemployed workers would try to re-enter the 
industrial sector6.
We assume that for black sector workers searching on the job is costless. This means 
that if any of the two regular sectors offers an higher wage they may leave the black 
sector:
6 Actually even for X=r=0  they would try and this would lead them to the black 
sector with probability p.
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xWt+\Wl+ {\-\-i)W b*Wm (18)
A necessary conditions for Eq. (18) to be verified is Wl'tWm or Wt*Wm.
Figure 8 shows that:
for nm<nm, the equilibrium-wage o f the rent-seeldng sector is Wm=0, 
for nOT>»^, the equilibrium-wage o f the rent-seeking sector is Wm=Wl>§
Ceteris paribus, Eq. (18) is surely verified if n < n ’m (where n’m is the unstable 
equilibrium depicted in fig. 8). In the framework of our model it means that time 
matters. The more people get involved in rent-seeking activities, the lower moral 
costs are and the greater the wage of the industrial sector needs to be to motivate 
people to try leaving the black for the industrial sector. If the size of the black sector 
is less than n’m the system may come back to a no black sector equilibrium, otherwise 
the black sector will remain in the economy. This dichotomy in the pattern of the 
black sector can be justified by thinking of an initial group of "amoral" people who 
would always go for black sector activities. Once this original group gets bigger, 
"moral" people revert to black sector activities since moral costs are very much 
lower.
As pointed out in section 3.5, this is due to the standard assumption that moral costs 
m depend negatively on the fraction of people into the black sector.
Proposition 3: privatization of the industrial sector and/or abolition of entry 
barriers to the trade sector would prevent the black sector appearing. However
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once the black sector (rent-seeking) has appeared and has developed the same 
Government policies might not be enough to rid it from society.
This conclusion could be strengthened by introducing into the model the workers’ loss 
of human capital deriving from a period of unemployment or black-sector activities 
which would reduce productivity, and in turn their per capita wage once they move 
back to any of the two regular sector.
4. Conclusions
We have presented a model aiming to describe the changes in the labour market in 
Russia during the transition from a command to a market economy. The USSR had 
an overregulate and substantially egalitarian labour market, while Russia has a very 
unequal and differentiated labour market. We argued that is due to the fact that 
transition affected different productive sectors in different ways. The trade sector 
reformed much more quickly and more effectively than the industrial sector. Workers 
of the trade sector enjoy higher wages than those of the industrial sector. Workers 
tend to move away from the industrial sector toward the trade sector attracted by 
large wage differentials. At equilibrium the wage differential and the number of 
people who search for a job will depend on the hiring and firing probability of both 
sectors.
Employment data show that the industrial sector, in need of deep restructuring, has 
consistently been a job destructing sector since privatization started; the trade sector 
has been job creator, but not enough to absorb all the workers leaving the industrial
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sector. The wage differential does not seem reduced which therefore points to the 
existence of some entry barriers. A large and non-reducing wage differential is a 
source of social tension and of instability of the current equilibrium. We have argued 
that Government policies should try to close the wage gap, bringing the Russian 
system close to a competitive market economy where barriers are very much reduced. 
Indeed, Government policies should facilitate a market solution through the 
completion of the privatization program for the industrial sector and the relaxation 
of the entry barriers to the trade sector. In the absence of these, we have argued that 
a black sector might eventually appear and develop offering a better alternative to 
unemployment. The black economy might become the real antagonist to the trade 
sector. This, in turn, would increase the pressure for Government intervention. We 
have also shown that once the black sector has developed, further privatization of the 
industrial sector and/or abolition of the entry barriers to the trade sector may not be 
enough to free society of the black sector.
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ANNEX 1
Changes of Wt/WEand P£(s) with !  for a given^l
Case 1 (zone A):>01/(2-t) 
\ 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
t 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 5,00 4 ,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 2,42
PIS 0,75 0,67 0,60 0,52 0,44 0,36
Case 1 (zone A):^>1/(2-T) [not on the graph]
4 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
T 0,50 0.50 0,50 0,50 0.50 0,50
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 1,50 1.45 1,40 1,35 1.30 1.25
PIS 0.75 0,73 0,70 0.68 0,65 0,63
Case 2 (borderline between A and B):/l = 1 /(2-T)
4 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
T 0.67 0,67 0,67 0.67 0.67 0.67
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 1,12 1.12 1.12 1,12 1.12 1.12
PIS 0,75 0,75 0.75 0,75 0,75 0,75
Case 2 (zone B):/I<1/(2-t)
4 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
T 1.00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1.00 1,00
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 0,75 0.80 0,85 0,90 0,95 1,00
PIS 0,75 0.80 0,85 0.90 0,95 1,00
GRAPH for Wt/Wfc 
S 0,00 0 ,20 0,40 0,60 ‘ 0 ,80 1,00
r = , i  5 5,00 4,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 2,42
T=,67 1.12 1,12 1,12 1,12 1,12 1,12
T =  1 0,75 0,80 0,85 0,90 0,95 1,00
GRAPH for PKS) 
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
T=,15 0,75 0,67 0,60 0,52 0,44 0,36
T = ,67 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
T=  1 0,75 0,80 0,85 0,90 0,95 1,00
4 4 4
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ANNEX 2 (Section 3.4)
Table 1 (millions of workers)
91 92 93Q1 93 94Q3 94Q4
Labour 51,8 49 ,8 49 48,4 45,3 45,2
Trade 22 22,2 23 22,6 24,8 24,8
Tot Empl. 73,8 72 72 71 70,1 70
Table 2a
K= 1 94Q4-91 3Q1-91 3-93Q1 4Q4-93
lambda
theta
kappa
tau
\
th
k
t= th /k
0,87
0,42
1,00
0,42
0,95
0,36
1,00
0,36
0,99
neg
1,00
0,93
0,69
1,00
0,69
92-91 3Q1-92
0,96
0,10
1,00
0,10
0,98
1,00
1,00
1,00
Search rate S 0 0 0 0
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 2,057 2,649 1,358
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,873 0,946 0,934
0 0
9,614 0,984
0,961 0,984
Search rate S 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 1,615 1,873 1,194
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,685 0,669 0,821
0,5 0,5
5,481 0,992
0,548 0,992
Search rate S 1 1 1 1
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 1,173 1,097 1,03
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,498 0,392 0,708
1 1
1,347 1
0,135 1
Table 2b
K = 3 94Q4-91 3Q1-91 3-93Q1 4Q4-93
lambda
theta
kappa
tau
\
th
k
T=th/k
0,87
0,42
3,00
0,14
0,95
0,36
3,00
0,12
0,99
neg
3,00
0,93
0,69
3,00
0,23
92-91 3Q1-92
0,96
0,10
3,00
0,03
0,98
1,00
3,00
0,33
Search rate S 0 0 0 0
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 6,17 7,946 4,075
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,873 0,946 0,934
0 0
28,84 2,952
0,961 0,984
Search rate S 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 3,972 4,673 2,649
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,562 0,556 0,607
0,5 0,5
15,48 1,992
0,516 0,664
Search rate S 1 1 1 1
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 1,774 1,4 1,222
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,251 0,167 0,28
1 1
2,12 1,032
0,071 0,344
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ANNEX 2 (Section 3.4)
Table 2cu>II54 94Q4-91 3Q1-91 3-93Q1 4Q4-93
lambda
theta
kappa
tau
\
th
k
T=th/k
0,87
0,42
5,00
0,08
0,95
0,36
5,00
0,07
0,99
neg
5,00
0,93
0,69
5,00
0,14
92-91 3Q1-92
0,96
0,10
5,00
0,02
0,98
1,00
5,00
0,20
Search rate S 0 0 0 0
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 10,28 13,24 6,792
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,873 0,946 0,934
0 0
48,07 4,92
0,961 0,984
Search rate S 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 6,329 7,473 4,103
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,537 0,534 0,564
0,5 0,5
25,48 2,992
0,51 0,598
Search rate S 1 1 1 1
Req. Wage dif Wt/WI 2,374 1,703 1,415
Prob Prem. PKS) 0,201 0,122 0,195
1 1
2,892 1,064
0,058 0,213
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ANNEX 3
Case 1 (zone A): 
I
I > 1 /<2-t) 
0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75' 0 ,75 0,75
t 0,15 0.15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15
m 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0 ,00
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 5,00 4,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 . 2 ,42
Wt/WI-m 5,00 4,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 2 ,42
Wt/WI-m/t 5,00 4 ,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 2,42
PIS 0,75 0,67 0,60 0,52 0,44 0,36
Case 1 (zone A): 
I
l> 1/(2-t-m) 
0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
t 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15
m 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 5,00 4,48 3,97 3.45 2.93 2,42
Wt/WI-m 5,00 4,68 4,37 4.05 3,73 3,42
Wt/WI-m/t 3,67 3.35 3,03 2.72 2,40 2.08
PIS 0,75 0,70 0,66 0,61 0,56 0,51
Case 2 (borderline between A and B): I = 1 /(2-t-m)
I 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
t 0,15 0,15 0.15 0,15 0,15 0,15
m 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52 0,52
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 5,00 4,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 2,42
Wt/WI-m 5,00 5.00 5,00 5.00 5,00 5,00
Wt/WI-m/t 1,56 1,56 1,56 1,56 1,56 1,56
PIS 0,75 0,75 0,75 0.75 0,75 0,75
Case 2 (zone B): 
I
I < 1 /(2-t) 
0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75
t 0,15 0,15 0.15 0,15 0.15 0,15
m 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1.00 1,00
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 5,00 4,48 3,97 3,45 2,93 2,42
Wt/WI-m 5,00 5,48 5.97 6.45 6,93 7 ,42
Wt/WI-m/t -1,67 -1,18 -0,70 -0,22 0.27 0,75
PIS 0,75 0,82 0,90 0,97 1.04 1,11
Graph of Figure 10
S 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00
Wt/WI 5,00 4,48 3.97 3,45 2.93 2,42
Wt/WI-m/t; m= .1 3,67 3,35 3,03 2,72 2.40 2,08
Wt/WI-m/t; m », r 1.56 1,56 1.56 1.56 1,56 1,56
Wt/WI-m/t; .4 -1,67 -1,18 -0,70 -0,22 0,27 0,75
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Conclusions
Writing the conclusions of a four-year long thesis is a sad occurrence. To minimize 
the trouble I will keep them short. This last chapter is constructed as follows. Section 
1 gives a brief summary of the topics explored, highlighting the results we achieved. 
Section 2 deals with the limits and the shortcomings of our analysis and hints to our 
future paths of research. Section 3 has the ambitious task to point out the "big 
insights" I got from writing this thesis.
1. Summary
Each chapter of this thesis has dealt with the role of the state under different 
circumstances. We started from a fairly traditional approach to the theory of optimal 
taxation (chapter 1), we moved later to the analysis of the challenges posed by tax 
evasion (chapters 2 and 3) and we concluded with the policy options left to the state 
when straining through the transition from Central Planning to the Market (chapters 
4 and 5). In all chapters we have taken a pure micro-economic approach looking at 
how agents’ reactions to a given state policy determine the final equilibrium.
OPTIMAL TAXATION. Dealing with the theory of optimal taxation, we sought 
extensions of the main results to the most realistic case of non linear income and 
linear commodity taxes. In other words we have allowed the state to discriminate 
income taxation across agents and to discriminate commodity taxation only across
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goods, which is the most widespread case in reality.
We have aimed to add three pieces to the theory of taxation. First, we devised an 
efficient rule for the setting of commodity taxes differentiated across goods. Second, 
we have augmented the standard income tax rules by considerations aiming to offset, 
at least partially, the distortions introduced by commodity taxation. Such a result is 
quite encouraging for taxation theory since it implies that distortions created by an 
additional instrument can be mitigated by proper adaptation of the existing 
instruments. Boosted by this results we have explored whether this principle could 
be fruitfully extended to the provision of public goods. As a third result we have 
proved that the distortion introduced by commodity taxation to provision of public 
goods vanishes under the same conditions which make the distortion introduced by 
income taxation to vanish (more precisely, by the Government’s imperfect 
information on agents’s type when levying income taxation). This clearly extends the 
robustness of the second result and supports the use of more than one tax instrument. 
In other words, in the framework of a standard model, we have been able to show 
that commodity taxation can usefully supplement income taxation without necessarily 
creating additional distortions.
TAX EVASION. Taking stock of the results of this first chapter, we have extended 
in the second and in the third chapter our analysis to the case of commodity taxation 
when tax evasion is possible. We tried to give an answer to the following questions: 
is there a commodity tax structure more honesty enforcing than others? What are the
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implications in terms of integrity and efficiency of the tax system of a change from 
ad valorem taxes to value added taxes?
In the second chapter we have illustrated the historical development and the state of 
the art of the tax evasion literature arguing that its development has followed two 
main approaches: the taxpayer’s viewpoint approach and the social viewpoint 
approach. The former approach is substantially an exercise of utility maximization 
under uncertainty, the latter is a refinement of the Mirrlees-Stiglitz equation for 
optimal income taxation and of the Ramsey equation for optimal commodity taxation, 
respectively. Neither of the two approaches is suitable to describe the effects of a 
change from one tax structure to another and therefore to answer any of the questions 
raised above.
The model presented in the third chapter aims precisely to provide us with the 
answers to the above-mentioned questions. Our model is different from a typical 
model in the tax evasion literature since it does not seek to maximize a given tax 
structure, but it looks at the effects of a change from one tax structure (ad valorem 
tax) to another (value added tax). This type of reform is empirically very relevant, 
since the existence of the value added tax is a prerequisite for candidate countries to 
join the European Union. This requirement is usually justified, from an economic 
point of view, on the production efficiency ground since VAT, allowing inputs to 
enter the production function free of taxes, is neutral with respect to production 
decisions. Our aim has been to show that this requirement has also a justification in 
terms of fiscal policy.
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Two parallel markets, a black and a regular one, are described. Both the black and 
the regular market are divided into 3 stages of production: raw material, intermediate 
good and final good. We first have shown that a VAT system unequivocally increases 
the integrity of the tax system (i.e. the fraction of people operating in the regular 
market rather than in the black one) and second that the efficiency of the tax system 
(i.e. the total tax revenues collected) is a direct function of its integrity. Finally, as 
a passing result, we have proved that a tax reform from add valorem commodity 
taxation to value added taxation is a welfare improvement for the "ever-honestM 
consumers since more goods are available at a lower price. The efficacy of the 
reform in fighting tax evasion (both in terms of number of agents and of volume of 
revenues) is a direct function of the amplitude of the reform. When the VAT system 
is introduced at all stages of the production the effect is maximum, but even a partial 
reform is effective.
TRANSITION ECONOMY. The transition from a command to a market economy 
poses to the Government, different, and arguably greater, challenges than those of 
a standard market economy. Looking at the transition from the USSR to Russia one 
observes among other things that production has collapsed, shortage has almost 
disappeared and unemployment has only very moderately increased.
In the fourth chapter we have tried to explain the apparent paradox of "less 
production and less shortage". Before transition began, there were two, apparently 
opposite, forecasts on the effects of privatization on the economic system. One
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argued that, since firms are only producing to fulfill (or over-fulfill) the plan, 
privatization will lead to a great fall of the GDP. The other argues that since firms 
could not keep profits, they were artificially under-producing in order to create 
shortage, thus being able to extract bribes. Once transition began, widespread 
privatization has allowed for profits appropriation. This has made agents adopt a 
profit maximizing behaviour. It means that loss-making firms have shut down, while 
profit-making firms have started producing at the optimal point. Both forecasts were 
correct, simply they applied to two mutually exclusive subsets of firms: those firms 
having production entirely determined by the plan, and those firms having some 
degree of freedom in choosing their production level. Typically, industrial firms 
belonged to the first subset and were loss-making, while service firms belonged to 
the second one and were profit-making. The closure of many industrial firms has 
therefore contributed to the reduction in total production, while the expansion of the 
firms in the service sectors (namely trade and distribution) has contributed to the 
shortage reduction.
In the fifth chapter we have presented a model of the labour market in transition 
aiming to describe the path from a full-employment with no search equilibrium (the 
USSR) to a new equilibrium with unemployment and search (Russia). Using a two- 
sector model where wages are a function of the sector productivity we have modelled 
the equilibrium unemployment and wage differential across sectors. They depend on 
the relative strength of the entry and exit barriers for workers into and from the two 
sectors. Both an internal equilibrium (a fraction of people searching) and a comer
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solution (all people searching) are possible. The stronger the entry barriers are to the 
most productive sector the higher is the wage differential among sectors. In terms of 
policy options we have argued that a prompt state intervention relaxing entry barriers 
to the most productive sectors would be the most appropriate measure. We have 
showed that, under some standard conditions in terms of moral costs, if a rent- 
seeking sector appears, wage differential across sectors will decrease and search will 
increase. The rent-seeking sector might become the viable alternative to 
unemployment and underemployment. The long term existence of a rent-seeking 
sector is guaranteed once the sector has reached a critical mass. At that point, though 
the existence of a rent-seeking sector would have increased the pressure for state 
intervention, the above mentioned state policies are not sufficient to free society of 
the rent-seeking sector, which means that for policy implications time matters.
2. Limits and Shortcomings
The aim of this section is not to give a list of all the conceivable limitations of each 
of the three models we have used. Limitations and shortcomings are necessarily many 
and they are a consequence of the assumptions of each model. We intend here to 
point out the most important ones in order to clarify the domain of applicability of 
our conclusions and their robustness. Surely there are many other restrictions, but the 
removal of the ones mentioned below have triggered our interest for future research.
The first model (chapter 1) is very traditional and all assumptions are already part of
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the optimal taxation literature. The framework is clearly oversimplified: a standard 
two-person two-good model of optimal taxation. Though the model allows for 
asymmetric information between agents and government, the agents* ability to profit 
of it, is limited by a self-selection constraint and tax evasion is not an option; the 
productive factor (labour) enjoys full-employment. Relaxation of these very standard 
assumptions seems to be a hard, but interesting path of research.
The second model (chapter 2) is clearly the less orthodox one and the easiest target 
for criticism. It should be remembered, however, that it is meant to be a first essay 
in the unexplored, to our best knowledge, direction of comparing two different tax 
structure of commodity taxation. In this model, firms have an oversimplified 1 to 1 
production function: buying 1 unit of input, they produce 1 unit of output to sell. 
This imposes two restrictions: first, it does not allow to verify the effect of a tax 
reform on the firms’ choices of inputs, i.e. it conceals the effects of a tax reform on 
input substitution; second firms can produce only zero or one and therefore is 
impossible to monitor accurately the effects of a tax reform on the firms’ choice of 
the optimal quantity to produce. In other words our model serves only the purpose 
of describing firms’ movement from the black to the regular sector after a tax 
reform, but not within firms’ productive decisions. The first restriction is the most 
worrying and dangerous one since it hides the distributive effects of a tax reform. 
Exploring this issue should be our next research step.
The third model (chapter 5) gives as an endogenous result the wage differential, but 
takes entry barriers as exogenous. We assume that in the USSR there was no
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autonomous search and therefore no issue of entry barriers for workers while in 
Russia different sectors raise different entry barriers to workers. We do not explain 
how during transition the strength of entry barriers might change and we simply 
picture different scenarios under different exogenous assumptions on the strength of 
entry barriers. Of course, the next step in this model is to endogenize entry barriers. 
A second area of improvement is to refine the wage function. For all sectors, we 
treated it as a function of the sector average productivity, which might be empirically 
valid, but it is not the standard market economy assumption of wage as a function of 
the worker’s marginal productivity. Furthermore, to assume that wages (net of moral 
costs) in the rent-seeking sector grow with the number of workers, at least for some 
segments, is crucial to obtain our result. However this assumption on moral costs is 
standard in the tax evasion literature.
3. Big Insights
As mentioned in the introduction, I started this thesis at the end of 1991: in the 80s 
there had been a fundamental rethinking of the role of the state. I embarked myself 
in the adventure of writing a PhD thesis motivated by the great ambition of 
explaining first to myself, and eventually to my reader(s), what is the role of the state 
in the economy. Great ambitions are often pursued with limited means. Shortly after 
the beginning, I found myself satisfying my desire of investigating the role of the 
state in the economy, by relaxing the hypothesis x in the paper y or, even worse, by 
sketching a new oversimplified model with many strong assumptions. However, I felt
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that this was the safest and most rigorous way to proceed and it allowed a gaining of 
some insights. I believe that I gave in the two preceding sections a fairly detailed 
report of the results achieved and of their robustness and general validity. In this very 
last section of the thesis I wish to go back to my initial motivation (to understand the 
role of the state in the economy) and briefly report on the big four insights I derived, 
in this respect, while working on this thesis.
1) Agents’ sovereignty is crucial in the determination of the final decentralized 
equilibrium. State policies must allow for the implementability constraints introduced 
into the model by agents’ preferences and agents’ behaviour.
Tax evasion is better fought giving an incentive not to evade and rent-seeking is 
fought by giving agents a better alternative.
2) Increased state intervention does not necessarily mean increased distortion if 
existing and new tools are tuned to offset other distortions. A global view of the 
instruments in a state’s hands minimizes the risk of distortions.
3) When tax evasion and tax compliance are relevant issues, income redistribution 
might be achieved through other policies than taxation. In a relatively "lawless" 
transition economy the introduction of regulation to prevent abuse of monopolistic 
power in hiring workers plays a role in redistributing resources.
4) Time matters. State intervention brings the economic system to different 
equilibrium points depending on agents’ reactions. Agents react differently to the 
same policy applied in different moments depending on their position at the moment 
of the intervention.
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